Background
Dado Lucas Lucero was found guilty in a bench trial before the District Court of the Third Circuit, South Kohala Division, of excessive speeding in violation of HRS § 291C-105(a)(2), which prohibits driving at 80 miles per hour or more regardless of the posted speed limit. A Hawai’i County police officer conducting late-night speed and DUI enforcement on Daniel K. Inouye Highway observed a vehicle accelerating away from traffic, pursued it for several miles, and ultimately tracked the vehicle at 92 miles per hour in a 60-mph zone.
At trial, Lucero testified that he did not know the vehicle behind him was a police car until the officer activated blue lights. He stated that the officer was following closely, “on my bumper,” which made him concerned for his safety given a disability. Lucero claimed he sped up to create distance and pull over to confront what he believed was an aggressive driver. After the stop, Lucero told the officer something to the effect of “I thought you were chasing me.”
The Court’s Holding
The ICA affirmed the conviction, holding that the evidence was sufficient to prove Lucero acted recklessly. Under HRS § 702-206(3), a person acts recklessly when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that his conduct is of a specified nature, and the disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of conduct a law-abiding person would observe in the same situation.
Applying the standard from State v. Gonzalez, 128 Hawai’i 314 (2012), the court noted that the State was required to prove Lucero “acted intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly.” Viewing the evidence in the strongest light for the prosecution under State v. Calaycay, 145 Hawai’i 186 (2019), the court concluded the evidence was sufficient to show that Lucero recklessly disregarded the risk of exceeding 80 mph, and that his disregard was a gross deviation from law-abiding conduct under the circumstances—driving at 92 mph on a highway, regardless of his subjective motivation for accelerating.
Key Takeaways
- A defendant’s subjective belief about why he was speeding (e.g., fleeing a perceived threat from a tailgater) does not negate the reckless mental state required for excessive speeding under HRS § 291C-105(a)(2).
- Evidence that a defendant reached 92 mph in a 60-mph zone is sufficient standing alone to support a finding of recklessness—a gross deviation from law-abiding conduct—even if the defendant claimed not to know a police officer was following.
- The prosecution need not prove a specific intent to speed; reckless disregard of the risk of driving at prohibited speeds satisfies the mental state element under Gonzalez.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces that Hawaii’s excessive speeding statute does not require proof that a defendant specifically intended to exceed 80 mph. For criminal defense practitioners challenging sufficiency of the evidence in speeding cases, Lucero makes clear that the defendant’s explanation for why he was speeding—even one involving a perceived safety concern—will not overcome the inference of recklessness when the objective speed reached far exceeds the statutory threshold. The case reminds practitioners that sufficiency challenges under Calaycay face a high bar, as all reasonable inferences are drawn in the prosecution’s favor on appellate review.