Background
In the early morning hours of September 12, 2021, Honolulu Police Department officers responded to a noise complaint at Maili Beach Park and observed a white Honda leave the area. Officer Joshua Nahulu allegedly led a vehicle pursuit of the Honda along Farrington Highway in Makaha. The Honda eventually skidded off the road, struck a curb, became airborne over a ditch, and rolled approximately 83 feet through a residential front yard. The occupants were ejected and suffered catastrophic injuries: the driver was in a vegetative state for weeks, and a fourteen-year-old passenger was paralyzed from the waist down. Eyewitnesses reported that Nahulu’s vehicle was nearest the Honda at the moment of the crash and that some witnesses saw his vehicle make contact with the Honda, though an accident reconstruction expert found no physical evidence of paint transfer or damage. The officers allegedly continued driving, never stopped to render aid, and returned to the scene only after other emergency vehicles had arrived.
Nahulu was charged under HRS § 291C-12(a), Hawaiʻi’s fled scene statute, which requires any “driver of any vehicle involved in a collision resulting in serious bodily injury” to immediately stop and render aid. Co-defendants Smith, Bartholome, and Lewis were charged with hindering prosecution and conspiracy to commit hindering prosecution. The State clarified through a court-ordered bill of particulars that it was not relying on a theory that Nahulu’s vehicle physically struck the Honda. Nahulu moved to dismiss, arguing the term “involved in a collision” was unconstitutionally vague and that the charging instrument failed to provide adequate constitutional notice. The Circuit Court of the First Circuit denied both motions, and defendants appealed.
The Hawaiʻi Supreme Court accepted transfer of the case and addressed two questions: whether “involved in a collision” is void for vagueness, and whether the charge, read together with the bill of particulars, gave constitutionally sufficient notice of the accusation.
The Court’s Holding
On the vagueness issue, the court first held that Nahulu lacked standing to mount a facial challenge to HRS § 291C-12(a) because the statute does not implicate free speech rights or otherwise burden a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct. A facial challenge is available only when the statute chills expression or reaches significant constitutional freedoms; absent those factors, a defendant is limited to arguing the statute is vague as applied to his specific conduct. Because the statute plainly and unambiguously covers drivers who physically collide with another vehicle, it is not facially vague. The court then rejected Nahulu’s as-applied challenge on three independent grounds: legislative history, precedent, and common sense. Hawai’i adopted the Uniform Vehicle Code’s fled scene language verbatim in 1971 precisely to broaden the duty to stop beyond situations of actual physical contact, and the 2021 substitution of “collision” for “accident” was a terminology modernization, not a narrowing of the statute’s reach. The ICA’s 1994 decision in State v. Chen had already read the statute expansively, and virtually every UVC state to consider the question has held that “involved in” an accident or collision does not require physical impact by the defendant’s vehicle.
On the notice issue, the court held that the constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of an accusation is satisfied by considering all information the State has provided to a defendant, not the charging instrument in isolation. Here, the circuit court ordered a bill of particulars and the State filed one, affirmatively stating it would not argue that Nahulu’s vehicle struck the Honda—thereby defining the theory of prosecution with precision. Taken together, the felony information and the bill of particulars gave Nahulu constitutionally adequate notice of what he must be prepared to meet at trial. The court affirmed the circuit court’s denial of both motions to dismiss.
Key Takeaways
- Under Hawaiʻi law, a driver can be “involved in a collision” for purposes of the fled scene statute even if his vehicle never physically struck another vehicle or person—proximate causation of the crash through conduct such as a high-speed pursuit is sufficient.
- Defendants without a First Amendment hook may not bring facial vagueness challenges; they are limited to as-applied challenges requiring a showing that the statute is vague with respect to their own specific alleged conduct.
- A bill of particulars, when ordered by the court and filed by the State, is considered together with the charging instrument in evaluating whether a defendant received constitutionally sufficient notice of the accusation against him.
- Hawaiʻi’s 2021 substitution of the word “collision” for “accident” in HRS § 291C-12(a) was a modernization of terminology—not a substantive narrowing—and does not limit the statute’s reach to situations of physical contact.
Why It Matters
This decision resolves a significant open question in Hawaiʻi—one the ICA expressly declined to answer in 1994—by confirming that law enforcement officers who initiate or participate in a vehicle pursuit that ends in a serious crash can face criminal liability under the fled scene statute even without physical contact between their vehicles and the crashed vehicle. The ruling aligns Hawaiʻi with the overwhelming majority of UVC states and reinforces that the purpose of fled scene laws is to protect crash victims by ensuring prompt aid, not merely to sanction drivers who directly collide with others.
For criminal practitioners, the case offers useful guidance on two procedural points that arise frequently: the limited scope of facial vagueness challenges in cases not involving expressive conduct, and the role of bills of particulars in curing or supplementing notice deficiencies in charging instruments. Prosecutors can use a targeted bill of particulars to sharpen the theory of the case and shore up notice arguments; defense counsel litigating vagueness must ground the challenge in the defendant’s specific alleged conduct rather than hypothetical applications of the statute.