Background
Ryan and Jennifer Bickerstaff married in 2015 and relocated from California to Eagle, Idaho in late 2021 when Jennifer accepted a vice president role at Intuit. The marriage deteriorated amid escalating conflict, and in March 2024—the day after their second child’s baptism—Jennifer took both children to Winter Park, Florida, where her parents and extended support network reside, without telling Ryan. She filed for divorce shortly thereafter, and the parties stipulated to Jennifer returning to Idaho with the children pending resolution of the divorce. Between March 2024 and July 2025, Jennifer made approximately fifteen allegations of child abuse against Ryan; all were investigated and closed as unsubstantiated. Jennifer’s position at Intuit was eliminated in October 2024 when the Eagle office closed, and she sought permanent relocation to Winter Park.
The magistrate court ordered a Parenting Time Evaluation (PTE), conducted by Dr. James Davidson. Dr. Davidson found both parents to be capable and attentive, both children bonded to each parent, and neither parent to have a comparative advantage in custodial fitness. He ultimately recommended relocation to Florida, citing the mother’s stronger social support network there, better employment prospects, and improved adjustment for the children—but he characterized the question as a “very close call” when he testified at the three-day trial in September 2025. Ryan testified that, while he opposed relocation, he did not know that he would have “any other choice” but to move to Florida himself if the court permitted it, because he feared a long-distance relationship would not preserve his bond with the children.
The magistrate court entered detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law, determined that Jennifer had met her burden of proving relocation was in the children’s best interests under Idaho Code § 32-717, and entered a partial judgment permitting relocation and awarding joint legal and physical custody. Ryan appealed directly to the Idaho Supreme Court on a certified, permissive basis under Idaho Appellate Rule 12.1(b).
The Court’s Holding
The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the magistrate court in all respects. Applying the multi-tiered abuse-of-discretion standard from Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, the Court concluded that Ryan failed to demonstrate any abuse of discretion. The Court first rejected Ryan’s argument that the magistrate court made a clearly erroneous factual finding that he would move to Florida if relocation were granted. Although Ryan’s trial testimony was hedged—he said he “might feel compelled” to move and could not “a hundred percent commit”—the magistrate court permissibly inferred from that testimony, read as a whole, that Ryan would in fact relocate to protect his relationship with the children. A factual finding supported by the evidence will not be disturbed on appeal even if the underlying testimony was equivocal.
The Court also rejected Ryan’s contentions that the magistrate court misapplied Idaho’s relocation and joint-custody law and failed to exercise reason in weighing the statutory best-interests factors under I.C. § 32-717(1). The opinion reaffirmed that Idaho’s statutory presumption in favor of joint custody and frequent contact with both parents is not “equivalent to a presumption against a custodial parent relocating with a child.” See Bartosz v. Jones, 146 Idaho 449, 456, 197 P.3d 310, 317 (2008). The governing standard remains, always, the best interests of the children—and once the relocating parent proves relocation serves those interests, the court may permit the move. The magistrate court’s thorough analysis of the statutory factors, its acknowledgment that the case was close, and its ultimate exercise of discretion in favor of relocation all fell within the bounds of the law.
Key Takeaways
- Idaho’s presumption favoring joint custody and frequent contact with both parents does not create a separate presumption against relocation; the sole governing standard is the best interests of the children.
- A magistrate court may find that a non-relocating parent “would” follow the children even where that parent’s trial testimony is ambiguous or hedged, so long as the inference is reasonably drawn from the record as a whole.
- A parenting time evaluator’s characterization of relocation as a “very close call” does not deprive the trial court of authority to decide the issue; the court has independent discretion to weigh the evidence and may resolve close cases in either direction.
- Unsubstantiated child-abuse allegations made by the relocating parent may be considered as a factor bearing on credibility or motives but do not automatically bar relocation if the overall best-interests analysis supports the move.
- The relocating parent bears the burden of proving that relocation is in the children’s best interests; once that burden is met, permission to relocate follows.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces Idaho’s long-standing rule—articulated in Bartosz and reiterated here—that courts must not conflate the state’s strong policy favoring ongoing contact with both parents with a thumb on the scale against relocation. Practitioners representing either side in an Idaho relocation dispute should note that the best-interests inquiry is holistic and fact-intensive: the children’s ties to Idaho, the relocating parent’s support network and employment prospects in the destination, the non-relocating parent’s own likely response to the order, and the quality of each proposed environment all factor into the analysis.
The case also offers a practical lesson on trial strategy: a parent who testifies—even equivocally—that he or she may feel “compelled” to follow the children to a new state risks having that testimony treated as a finding that he or she will move, with downstream consequences for how the custody schedule is structured. Counsel representing a client who genuinely intends to remain should ensure that intention is stated clearly and unambiguously on the record.