Background
Leanne Cheung obtained a judgment in 2006 against Raymundo G. Pena, her former attorney who has since been disbarred. The judgment arose from a worker’s compensation dispute in which Pena had retained $166,734.23 as a contingency fee. After proceedings before the Idaho Industrial Commission and an appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, the Court ordered Pena to remit $155,641.26 to Cheung. In August 2006, the Ada County district court entered judgment against Pena in the amount of $166,896.23. Cheung renewed the judgment in 2011 and again in 2016. At the time of the second renewal in 2016, the district court observed that the judgment erroneously reflected an award of $166,896.23, but that the correct amount of the award, in accordance with the remittitur and decision issued by the Supreme Court, was $155,803.26. On its own initiative, the district court issued an amended judgment correcting the award pursuant to Rule 60(a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
In early 2025, Cheung sought to renew the judgment for a third time. Pena objected, arguing that the judgment expired in December 2021 and that the lien created by the original judgment was null and void. The district court agreed with Pena and denied Cheung’s motion to renew the judgment. Cheung timely appealed.
When Cheung’s judgment was issued in 2006, Idaho Code section 10-1111(1) required a judgment creditor to renew a judgment every five years. In 2016, the Idaho Legislature changed the renewal period to ten years, but the enacting clause of that amendment expressly provided that the ten-year period applies “only to judgments issued on and after July 1, 2015.” This critical limitation was not codified in the Idaho Code.
The Court’s Holding
The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s denial of Cheung’s motion to renew. The Court held that the 2016 amendment unambiguously applies section 10-1111(1)’s ten-year renewal period exclusively to judgments finally concluding a controversy “on or after July 1, 2015.” Cheung’s judgment was subject to the five-year renewal period because it was issued prior to July 1, 2015, and its subsequent renewal and amendment after that date did not permit her to avail herself of the more generous renewal period. Neither the renewal nor amendment of the judgment finally concluded her litigation with Pena.
The Court explained that when a judgment “issues,” it is “put forth officially,” marking the point at which “the court has finally decided the controversy.” “Issuance” does not refer to non-concluding acts like “renewal,” which merely asks the court to restate its earlier decision in order to facilitate enforcement. The Court concluded that the 2016 amendment’s enacting clause unambiguously refers to original judgments when it speaks of “judgments issued on and after July 1, 2015.” Original judgments are those that finally resolved the controversy and were entered on or after that date. The ten-year renewal period does not apply to original judgments entered before July 1, 2015, even if those judgments were renewed after that date.
Regarding the 2016 amended judgment, the Court held that it corrected a clerical error under Rule 60(a). The mistake was mechanical in nature: the district court carried the wrong dollar figure from the remittitur into the judgment. Because the error was clerical rather than judicial, it did not require vacating the original judgment under Rules 59(e) or 60(b). The 2016 amended judgment did not disturb the original judgment’s finality or its governance over the parties’ rights and obligations; it merely restated, accurately, what the original judgment should have said. It was therefore not a judgment that independently “finally decided the controversy.” The 2006 judgment remains the operative one. Because the 2016 amendment did not displace the original judgment, the 2006 judgment remains the one “issued” within the meaning of Senate Bill 1362’s enacting clause. Since its date of issuance precedes July 1, 2015, Cheung’s judgment remains subject to the five-year renewal period in effect at the time of its entry. The Court concluded that Cheung’s judgment expired on December 11, 2021, five years after its most recent renewal on December 12, 2016, rendering it unenforceable.
Key Takeaways
- The 2016 amendment to Idaho Code section 10-1111(1) unambiguously applies its ten-year renewal period exclusively to original judgments entered on or after July 1, 2015.
- A judgment “issues” when it is “put forth officially,” marking the point at which the court has finally decided the controversy; renewal does not constitute issuance.
- An amended judgment correcting a clerical error under Rule 60(a) does not disturb the original judgment’s finality or constitute a new judgment that “issues” for purposes of the renewal statute.
- The Idaho Code is merely evidence of the laws enacted by the legislature as set forth in the session laws; the session laws are the law.
Why It Matters
This decision clarifies that the 2016 amendment’s ten-year renewal period applies only to original judgments entered on or after July 1, 2015, and that renewal or amendment of a pre-existing judgment does not bring it under the more generous renewal period. The Court emphasized that the Idaho Code is not the law; the session laws are the law, and practitioners must consult the session laws to determine the applicable law.
The decision also reinforces the distinction between clerical errors correctable under Rule 60(a) and judicial errors requiring relief under Rules 59(e) or 60(b). A clerical error correction does not create a new judgment or disturb the original judgment’s finality, even when it affects the judgment’s statement of the parties’ rights and obligations.