Background
Cavalry SPV I, LLC sued James K. Bernard Jr. for account stated on a $10,432.50 credit card debt originally issued by Citibank in February 2018. Bernard’s last payment was in February 2020. The debt was charged off in January 2021 and assigned to Cavalry in March 2021. Cavalry filed suit in August 2022. Bernard retained counsel, who appeared in May 2023 but never filed an answer to the complaint. The trial court entered default judgment against Bernard on May 7, 2024.
Bernard did not discover the default judgment until January 23, 2025—eight months after it was entered—when he called the court directly. He then discovered his attorney had not communicated the judgment to him. Bernard terminated his attorney’s representation and filed a pro se motion to vacate the judgment under section 2-1401 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure in February 2025. Bernard argued his attorney’s negligence in failing to file an answer and communicate about the case constituted excusable neglect, and asserted he had a meritorious defense because Cavalry failed to establish a valid assignment agreement proving its standing.
The circuit court dismissed Bernard’s section 2-1401 petition on May 15, 2025. Bernard appealed.
The Court’s Holding
The appellate court affirmed the dismissal of Bernard’s section 2-1401 petition. The court held that Bernard failed to demonstrate the due diligence required to vacate a default judgment. Under Illinois law, a section 2-1401 petitioner must show three elements: (1) a meritorious defense, (2) due diligence in presenting that defense, and (3) due diligence in filing the petition itself. Because Bernard failed on the second element, the court did not address the merits of his underlying standing defense.
The court explained that while litigants are generally bound by their attorney’s negligence in civil cases, the trial court may relax the due diligence requirement only under extraordinary circumstances—such as fraud, fundamental unfairness, or circumstances beyond the petitioner’s control. Bernard’s petition presented no such extraordinary circumstances. Bernard had a general duty to follow the progress of his case but failed to do so, waiting six months before following up with his attorney and eight months before discovering the judgment. The court distinguished Bernard’s case from *Cavalry Portfolio Services v. Rocha*, where relief was granted when a petition was filed within three days of learning of the default judgment.
The court also held it lacked jurisdiction to review Bernard’s post-judgment motion requesting a hearing on a bystander’s report, because Bernard’s notice of appeal did not specify this collateral issue and he failed to amend or file a new notice of appeal to challenge it.
Key Takeaways
- Debtors have a general duty to monitor the progress of their cases; failure to do so is not excused merely by attorney negligence absent extraordinary circumstances.
- Section 2-1401 petitions require due diligence in both presenting the defense and filing the petition; lack of diligence on either ground justifies dismissal regardless of the merits of the underlying defense.
- Equitable relaxation of due diligence requirements is reserved for cases involving fraud, fundamental unfairness, or circumstances entirely outside the petitioner’s control.
- Post-judgment motions not specified in the notice of appeal are outside appellate jurisdiction and cannot be reviewed absent amendment or a new notice of appeal.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces the principle that debtors seeking to vacate default judgments bear a responsibility to track their own litigation, regardless of attorney conduct. While the court acknowledged that section 2-1401 relief is available when an attorney’s negligence results in a default, it made clear this relief is not automatic. An eight-month gap between judgment entry and discovery—coupled with Bernard’s failure to follow up with counsel earlier—fell short of the diligence required. The holding creates a significant practical burden on pro se debtors in debt-collection cases, as they cannot simply rely on counsel to notify them of developments and deadlines.
The opinion also contains a notable warning to litigants about compliance with citation rules. The court found that Bernard’s filings contained numerous fabricated or hallucinated case citations—whether produced by generative AI or poor research—and reiterated that both pro se litigants and licensed attorneys must comply with Illinois Supreme Court Rules governing citations and brief submissions. This reflects growing judicial scrutiny of AI-assisted legal research and drafting.