Background
Jorge Luis Cortes-Yepez sought a stalking no contact order (SNCO) against his former coworker, Gerardo Avelar, based on a series of violent and threatening acts that occurred while they worked together at a restaurant. Between September and November 2024, respondent engaged in multiple acts of physical abuse and threats directed at petitioner due to his sexual orientation, including hitting him with a clam, asphyxiating him with a plastic bag while making death threats, and punching him. Petitioner reported the conduct to police, who advised him to obtain a protective order first. On December 17, 2024, petitioner filed for an emergency SNCO, which the trial court granted.
At the plenary hearing on March 11, 2025, the trial court found petitioner’s allegations credible and “serious,” “outrageous,” and “despicable.” However, the court denied the permanent SNCO solely because petitioner and respondent no longer worked together—petitioner had left the restaurant on December 31, 2024, and the restaurant had since closed. The trial court stated it saw no “need” for the order, reasoning that because the parties would not see each other in the future, protection was unnecessary. Petitioner appealed.
The Court’s Holding
The Illinois Appellate Court reversed the trial court’s decision and held that the Stalking No Contact Order Act mandates issuance of an SNCO whenever a court finds that a petitioner has been a victim of stalking. The court emphasized that the statute’s use of “shall issue” creates a mandatory duty, not discretionary authority. Under the plain language of the statute, once stalking is established by a preponderance of the evidence, a court cannot deny the order based on changed circumstances or other factors.
The appellate court found that the trial court’s factual determination that stalking occurred was sound—the court had explicitly stated it believed petitioner’s testimony and had not found the allegations to be refuted or denied. The court rejected the trial court’s reasoning that the order was unnecessary because the parties no longer worked together. It noted that the Stalking Act’s purpose is to provide a remedy for victims who have safety fears or emotional distress, and unlike the Domestic Violence Act, the Stalking Act contains no relationship-based restrictions. The possibility of future contact, though remote, is not impossible, and petitioner should have the protective tools the statute provides.
Key Takeaways
- Once a court finds stalking by a preponderance of the evidence, the Stalking No Contact Order Act mandates issuance of an SNCO; courts have no discretion to deny it based on other factors.
- Changed circumstances—such as parties no longer working together—do not justify denial of a plenary SNCO after stalking has been found.
- The Stalking Act applies regardless of the relationship between the parties and provides broader protection than the Domestic Violence Act, which is limited to family or household members.
- SNCO violations carry serious criminal penalties (Class A misdemeanor for first violation, Class 4 felony for subsequent violations), giving petitioners accessible law enforcement tools to prevent future abuse.
Why It Matters
This decision solidifies that Illinois courts cannot use discretion to deny stalking no contact orders after finding that stalking has occurred. It clarifies the mandatory nature of the Stalking Act and prevents courts from weighing pragmatic considerations—like the unlikelihood of future contact—against the statute’s protective purpose. The ruling strengthens civil remedies for stalking victims by ensuring they receive the legal tools needed to invoke law enforcement intervention, which is particularly important in cases of workplace harassment or domestic-adjacent scenarios that fall outside the Domestic Violence Act’s scope.
For attorneys representing stalking victims, this case establishes that once testimony or evidence establishes the required elements of stalking by a preponderance of the evidence, a trial court’s factual findings should lead to mandatory issuance of protection orders. Trial courts may not second-guess the necessity of such orders based on changed circumstances or probability of future contact.