Background
Keylla A. is the mother of A.A., a child born in February 2013. In October 2023, the State filed a wardship petition alleging the child was neglected due to domestic violence between the mother and her paramour, Christopher B. In February 2024, the trial court found the child neglected and placed her in DCFS custody in April 2024. The mother had been directed to distance herself from Christopher and obtain a protective order, but she allowed him to remain in contact with her and declined to seek the order.
In December 2025, the State moved to terminate the mother’s parental rights, alleging she failed to make reasonable efforts to correct the removal conditions or reasonable progress toward the child’s return during three consecutive nine-month periods spanning from February 2024 through May 2026. At the fitness hearing in February 2026, the mother’s attorney informed the court of a communication breakdown and requested to withdraw; the court denied the request, noting that no written motion had been filed and proceeding would not be delayed. The mother objected repeatedly, claiming she had not consulted with her attorney and had been assigned four different attorneys throughout the case.
The Court’s Holding
The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed the trial court’s termination order. The court rejected the mother’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, holding that the Cronic standard—which presumes prejudice for complete denial of counsel in criminal proceedings—does not extend to Juvenile Court Act termination proceedings, which are statutory rather than constitutional in nature and not adversarial. Under the applicable Strickland standard, the mother failed to show counsel’s performance was deficient; the attorney cross-examined witnesses, raised evidentiary objections, and advocated for the mother throughout the proceedings. The evidence overwhelmingly established unfitness independent of any counsel deficiency: the mother received unsatisfactory ratings for cooperation with DCFS, failed to follow service plans, and had unauthorized contact with the child despite court orders.
The court also rejected the mother’s hearsay challenge to caseworker testimony about the therapist’s statements regarding the mother’s honesty and therapy attendance. The court found any such error harmless because identical information appeared in the properly admitted service plans, which qualify as business records under the Juvenile Court Act. Moreover, ample independent evidence supported unfitness: the mother’s failure to maintain distance from Christopher, sporadic mental health treatment, minimal progress on domestic violence services, and repeated unsatisfactory ratings across three service plan periods demonstrated she was not approaching child reunification.
Key Takeaways
- Courts may deny attorney substitution requests at the commencement of fitness hearings when no written motion exists and allowing substitution would delay long-scheduled proceedings.
- The Cronic presumption of prejudice does not apply in Juvenile Court Act termination proceedings; ineffective assistance claims require showing both deficient performance and prejudice under Strickland.
- Service plans admitted as business records under the Juvenile Court Act may render admission of hearsay testimony harmless when the same information is contained in the admissible record.
- Reasonable progress requires objective, demonstrable movement toward reunification, not merely technical completion of services; continued involvement with the domestic violence perpetrator negates progress claims.
Why It Matters
This decision clarifies critical distinctions between criminal and Juvenile Court Act proceedings for attorneys representing parents in DCFS termination cases. The court’s reaffirmation that Cronic presumptions do not apply to non-adversarial statutory family court proceedings signals that ineffective assistance claims require greater proof in this context than practitioners might expect from criminal practice. The holding on attorney substitution also signals courts will prioritize proceeding over accommodating representation changes when hearings have been scheduled for extended periods.
Substantively, the opinion reinforces that reasonable progress is an objective standard measured against the specific conditions precipitating removal and documented through service plan compliance. A parent’s maintenance of contact with the individual whose conduct caused child removal, combined with sporadic engagement in mental health and domestic violence services, constitutes a failure to make reasonable progress—even where individual service components have been technically completed. For DCFS counsel and caseworkers, the decision validates reliance on service plan documentation as the primary mechanism for establishing progress (or lack thereof) in parental termination litigation.