Background
A.H. was born in January 2024. Both A.H. and her mother, Anissa H., tested positive for methamphetamine, and the child was removed shortly after birth. The circuit court later found A.H. neglected and placed her in the custody and guardianship of the Department of Children and Family Services.
In April 2024, Anissa H. was sentenced to eight years in prison after pleading guilty to methamphetamine trafficking. The circuit court initially terminated her parental rights, but the appellate court reversed that termination as to A.H. and remanded. On remand, the State filed a new termination petition alleging, among other grounds, unfitness based on incarceration under section 1(D)(r) of the Adoption Act.
The Court’s Holding
The appellate court affirmed the finding that Anissa H. was unfit under section 1(D)(r). She was incarcerated when the second termination petition was filed, DCFS had custody of A.H., and her incarceration would prevent her from discharging parental responsibilities for more than two years after the petition’s filing.
The court rejected her argument that she had too little time after A.H.’s birth to establish a relationship before incarceration. The evidence showed that she made no effort to visit or contact A.H. before incarceration and provided no support. The court held that the child’s removal after the positive drug tests did not excuse that lack of effort. Because one proven statutory ground of unfitness sufficed, the court did not address the other alleged grounds.
Key Takeaways
- A single properly established statutory ground of parental unfitness supports affirmance of a termination judgment.
- Under section 1(D)(r), the State may establish the retrospective element through little or no preincarceration contact or little or no preincarceration support.
- A child’s removal at birth does not itself preclude a finding that a parent failed to take minimum steps toward parental responsibilities before incarceration.
Why It Matters
The decision applies the incarceration-based unfitness provision where a parent’s lack of preincarceration involvement, rather than incarceration alone, supported termination. It also confirms that a parent’s limited opportunity to form a relationship does not defeat the statutory ground when the record shows no effort at contact or support before incarceration.