Background
Bryan and Kari Dow married in February 2018 and had one son, born in January 2019. In May 2022, facing marital difficulties, the couple sold their Illinois home. Bryan drove Kari and their son to her father’s condo in Florida and then returned to Illinois for work. The parties disputed whether the move was permanent: Kari testified Bryan had agreed to relocate to Florida, while Bryan maintained the move was exploratory and that he intended to return. In July 2022, Kari obtained a Florida emergency order of protection against Bryan based on allegations of physical and mental abuse; the order later became permanent and prohibited Bryan from contact with both Kari and their son.
Bryan filed for dissolution of marriage in Illinois in August 2022. In October 2022, he filed an emergency motion to return the child to Illinois, arguing that Kari had violated section 609.2 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (MDMA) — the statute governing parental relocation of minor children — by moving without providing written notice or a court petition. After a three-day evidentiary hearing, Judge Boyd denied the motion on two independent grounds: section 609.2 did not apply because no dissolution proceeding had been filed when Kari moved, and Bryan had in any event consented to the relocation, with his contrary testimony found “evasive” and “not credible.”
The case proceeded to trial before Judge Trowbridge in summer 2024, who adopted Judge Boyd’s relocation ruling without relitigating it and heard only evidence post-dating that order. The trial focused on finances. Bryan was on disability and unemployment following a motorcycle accident. Kari had minimal earned income (roughly $500 in commissions over the prior year) and relied primarily on approximately $6,000 per month from her father, which she testified was a loan she was obligated to repay. The court entered an Allocation Judgment permitting Kari and the child to remain in Florida, and a Dissolution Judgment ordering Bryan to pay $1,300 per month in child support, excluding the father’s monthly payments from Kari’s income calculation.
The Court’s Holding
The appellate court affirmed on both issues. On relocation, the court held that section 609.2 of the MDMA was inapplicable because the statute only governs parents who have already been allocated a majority or equal share of parenting time pursuant to a court order — a status that did not exist when Kari moved to Florida, as the parties had not yet even filed for dissolution. The court relied on the plain language of the statute and prior decisions holding section 609.2 inapplicable in the absence of an existing parenting-time allocation, and rejected Bryan’s policy argument that this reading would incentivize parents to spirit children away before filing for divorce, noting that courts retain full authority to adjudicate custody once dissolution proceedings begin and that criminal child-abduction laws remain available.
On child support, the court held that whether money received from a family member constitutes “income” under the MDMA is a fact-dependent inquiry, not a categorical rule. The court rejected Bryan’s argument that all loan proceeds are automatically income, noting that the Illinois Supreme Court in In re Marriage of Rogers, 213 Ill. 2d 129 (2004), expressly declined to resolve that question and that subsequent appellate decisions have consistently held that bona fide loans with genuine repayment obligations are generally not income. Because Bryan challenged only the legal framework — not the trial court’s specific factual finding that Kari’s father’s payments were genuine loans — the court had no basis to disturb the finding and affirmed.
Key Takeaways
- Section 609.2 of the MDMA, which regulates parental relocation of minor children, does not apply unless a parenting-time allocation is already in place; it has no reach over a move made before dissolution proceedings are even filed.
- Whether funds received from a family member constitute “income” for child support purposes under the MDMA is a factual determination made by the trial court; unrebutted testimony that the amounts are genuine loans subject to repayment can support a finding that they are not income.
- An appellant who fails to challenge a trial court’s factual finding — and instead presses only an incorrect categorical legal argument — forfeits the ability to obtain appellate relief on that issue.
- This decision is filed under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23 and is non-precedential except in the limited circumstances provided by Rule 23(e)(1).
Why It Matters
The relocation holding clarifies for Illinois family-law practitioners that section 609.2’s procedural requirements — written notice, petition, and multi-factor judicial findings — simply do not come into play when a parent moves with a child before any parenting-time order exists. This fills a gap that arises with some frequency in cases where couples separate informally before one spouse files for divorce, and it confirms that the statutory relocation framework is triggered by the existence of a court-ordered parenting arrangement, not merely by the existence of a child.
The child-support ruling reinforces the fact-intensive nature of the income inquiry under the MDMA when intrafamily transfers are involved. Courts must look beyond labels — “loan” or “gift” — and examine whether a genuine repayment obligation exists. For practitioners, the case underscores the importance of building a clear evidentiary record on the nature of any such transfers and of challenging both the legal framework and the underlying factual findings on appeal, rather than relying solely on a categorical legal argument.