Background
K.O. and Fernando Olea divorced on December 6, 2024, and share two children, ages six and four. Their parenting arrangement gives Olea daytime custody (9 a.m. to 7 p.m.) on two weekend days per month, with no overnight visits. Exchanges occur at the Schaumburg Police Department.
K.O. alleged a pattern of threatening conduct. In February 2025, Olea requested passports for the children to take them to New York and Spain, despite having only 10-hour parenting windows. The parenting plan designated K.O. as the sole passport holder due to Olea’s history of withholding or concealing the children. In April 2024, Olea took the children and told K.O., “Let’s hope you see them again. You probably should tell them bye,” before disengaging the vehicle’s tracking device. K.O. testified that Olea made threats including “I can make bodies disappear” and threatened to kick her in the throat if she touched him when retrieving a child.
Olea also sent K.O. a self-made “cease and desist” certified letter in July 2025, then emailed both K.O. and her employer demanding confirmation she received it, despite having proof of delivery. In response, K.O.’s employer changed its standard operating procedures to accept deliveries addressed to K.O. only if expected in advance. K.O. filed for a plenary order of protection on August 18, 2025; the trial court held a hearing on October 30, 2025, and granted a two-year order. Olea appealed.
The Court’s Holding
The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s two-year order of protection, holding that K.O.’s testimony established “harassment” under the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986 in three ways. First, Olea created a disturbance at K.O.’s workplace by emailing her employer; the employer’s response—altering delivery procedures—constituted a disturbance under the statute. Second, Olea improperly concealed the children on at least one occasion and repeatedly threatened to remove them from K.O.’s jurisdiction or custody, contrary to the parenting plan. Third, Olea threatened physical force through statements about making bodies disappear and kicking K.O. in the throat.
Under the Act, each form of harassment is presumed to cause emotional distress unless the respondent rebuts the presumption by a preponderance of the evidence. Olea presented no evidence and did not testify, leaving K.O.’s testimony unrebutted. The trial court explicitly found K.O.’s testimony credible. The appellate court held that a trial court’s factual findings regarding abuse will not be disturbed unless they are against the manifest weight of the evidence—a high bar. Here, the opposite conclusion was not clearly apparent, and the findings were neither unreasonable nor unsupported by evidence.
The court rejected Olea’s argument that K.O. failed to prove intent or purpose behind his conduct, noting that she could rely on the acts themselves and their circumstances without proving his subjective state of mind. The court also rejected his challenge to the workplace disturbance, finding that K.O.’s testimony—without employer testimony or documents—was sufficient proof under the Act’s permissive evidentiary standards. Olea’s reliance on a DCFS investigation that found no physical abuse was deemed irrelevant because K.O. had not alleged child abuse in seeking the order.
Key Takeaways
- Victim testimony alone, if credible and unrebutted, can establish harassment under the Domestic Violence Act without corroborating witnesses or documents.
- An employer’s policy change in response to unwanted contact qualifies as a workplace disturbance, triggering statutory presumption of emotional distress.
- Respondent bears the burden of rebutting the statutory presumption of emotional distress; remaining silent or failing to present evidence forfeits this defense.
- Trial courts have broad discretion to tailor protective orders to individual circumstances, including no-contact provisions during custody exchanges and firearm surrender requirements.
- Hearsay objections to victim testimony are forfeited if not raised at trial, and appellate courts give substantial deference to the trial court’s credibility determinations.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces Illinois’s broad approach to domestic violence protection in custody disputes. The court emphasized that the Domestic Violence Act’s purpose is to prevent future harm to victims, and the statutory framework for harassment—including presumptions of emotional distress and permissive proof standards—reflects a legislative judgment to favor victim safety. For divorced or separating parents with contested custody, the decision clarifies that threatening conduct regarding children (removal, concealment, or refusal to return them) can trigger protective orders even without documented evidence of the threats or a respondent’s testimony.
The holding also has practical implications for workplace conduct. Olea’s emails to K.O.’s employer, though not inherently violent or threatening, qualified as harassment because they caused a measurable workplace disruption. This expands the reach of protective orders beyond direct threats to the victim to encompass conduct that affects her employment. Additionally, the court’s affirmance of the firearm surrender provision signals judicial confidence in using protective orders to remove access to weapons in cases involving threats of physical harm, even where the threatener has not been charged with or convicted of a crime.