Background
Dillon Kaesberg and Jessica Kaesberg married in July 2017 and purchased a marital residence in Waterloo, Illinois, situated between Jessica’s workplace in Creve Coeur, Missouri, and Dillon’s chiropractic practice in Marissa, Illinois. Their child was born in September 2020. In April 2025, Dillon filed for dissolution of marriage in the Circuit Court of Monroe County. He moved to Red Bud, Illinois, in July 2025, while Jessica remained in the Waterloo marital home. The parties entered a marital settlement agreement and an agreed judgment allocating parental responsibilities in December 2025, which resolved most issues but left two matters for trial: the allocation of educational decision-making rights (specifically, school choice) and potential modification of the right of first refusal.
At a two-day bench trial in April 2026, the court heard evidence regarding the child’s daycare and pre-kindergarten history, academic performance, and the comparative merits of the Waterloo and Red Bud school districts. The child had attended Discovery Youth daycare in Red Bud since infancy and later attended pre-kindergarten programs in both Waterloo (Child’s World) and Red Bud (Discovery Youth) during the pendency of the divorce, pursuant to a temporary order allowing each parent to enroll the child in a program of their choice on their parenting days. Evidence established that the child was academically advanced and required intellectual challenge. Witnesses testified regarding the academic metrics, course offerings, and extracurricular activities available in both districts, as well as the transportation logistics necessitated by the parents’ residences in different towns.
The Court’s Holding
The Fifth District affirmed the trial court’s judgment ordering the child to attend Red Bud Public Schools. Applying the manifest weight of the evidence standard of review, the appellate court examined the trial court’s findings under the fifteen statutory best-interest factors set forth in section 5-602.5(c) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (750 ILCS 5/602.5). The court emphasized that it would not reweigh evidence or substitute its judgment for that of the trial court, which occupies a superior position to evaluate witness credibility and determine the child’s best interests.
Regarding factor two (child’s adjustment to home, school, and community) and factor six (prior agreements or course of conduct), the court rejected Jessica’s argument that Waterloo represented the sole status quo. The trial court had found the child was well adjusted to both communities, having attended Discovery Youth in Red Bud since infancy and participated in activities in both towns. The appellate court held that the trial court properly distinguished between pre-kindergarten and kindergarten placements and did not err in considering the child’s attendance at Discovery Youth, nor did it treat the temporary split-placement order as creating res judicata.
Addressing factor eight (child’s needs), the court upheld the trial court’s finding that both school districts could provide an appropriately challenging education. While acknowledging that certain standardized metrics favored Waterloo, the trial court did not err in concluding that both districts offered sufficient academic rigor, advanced placement courses, and extracurricular activities to meet the needs of a five-year-old child whose future interests remained speculative.
Concerning factor nine (distance and transportation difficulties), the court found no error in the trial court’s solution requiring Dillon to provide transportation on days Jessica worked in-office, given his offer to do so and the parties’ history of accommodating each other’s schedules. Finally, regarding factor fifteen (other relevant factors), the court held that the trial court properly considered Dillon’s community ties in Red Bud—including family support, the child’s involvement in local cheerleading, and familiarity with teachers—as these factors directly impacted the child’s stability and continuity of activities, rather than constituting impermissible parent-centric considerations.
Key Takeaways
- Trial court decisions regarding educational decision-making and school choice are reviewed under the deferential manifest weight of the evidence standard, and will not be disturbed merely because the appellate court might have reached a different conclusion.
- A child’s attendance at daycare or pre-kindergarten in a particular district, even if resulting from one parent’s unilateral action during pendency of divorce, may be considered by the trial court as part of the child’s adjustment to that community, provided the court does not treat temporary orders as binding precedent.
- When evaluating comparative school quality under factor eight, courts may consider qualitative factors such as community ties, teacher familiarity, and extracurricular continuity alongside quantitative metrics like standardized test scores and graduation rates.
- Transportation burdens created by school choice may be mitigated through specific court orders allocating transportation responsibilities between parents rather than necessarily dictating the choice of school district.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces the broad discretion trial courts exercise in making educational determinations for children of divorced parents and the difficulty appellants face in overturning such fact-intensive rulings. It clarifies that courts may consider a child’s established routine in a community, including daycare history and extracurricular involvement, as relevant to the “adjustment” and “other relevant factors” analyses, even when that routine developed during the pendency of the divorce. The ruling also demonstrates that practical solutions to logistical problems—such as court-ordered transportation arrangements—can support a school choice that might otherwise create hardship for one parent.