Background
Lawrence Ordower and his law firm were represented by the defendants in a federal legal-malpractice action brought by Joseph Mizrachi. Mizrachi alleged that Ordower, while representing him in a proposed purchase of an interest in Brentwood Capital, excluded Mizrachi from the transaction after Mizrachi wired his share of the purchase funds.
A federal jury awarded Mizrachi $10,197,178, but the district court later vacated the verdict after the parties settled and dismissed the case with prejudice. Ordower and his firm then sued their former counsel, alleging negligent handling of the federal case. The Cook County circuit court entered summary judgment for the former counsel, holding that Ordower’s alleged misconduct toward Mizrachi barred the suit under unclean hands.
The Court’s Holding
The appellate court reversed and remanded. It held that the circuit court improperly resolved a factual credibility dispute at summary judgment by crediting Mizrachi’s ethics expert over Ordower’s expert concerning whether Ordower violated professional-conduct rules.
The court also held that unclean hands did not bar the malpractice claim. The alleged misconduct was directed at Mizrachi, not at the defendant attorneys in the malpractice suit, and defendants acknowledged that they were retained only after the underlying conduct occurred. Although vacatur of the federal judgment eliminated the verdict’s legal effect, it did not erase the sworn testimony from that trial or prevent its consideration as evidence.
Key Takeaways
- Unclean hands requires misconduct connected to the transaction at issue and directed toward the party asserting the defense.
- A court cannot weigh competing expert testimony or make credibility findings on summary judgment.
- Vacating a judgment nullifies the judgment and its legal effect, but does not erase testimony previously given in the proceeding.
Why It Matters
The decision limits the use of unclean hands as a defense to legal-malpractice claims where the plaintiff’s alleged wrongdoing harmed someone other than the defendant lawyer. It also reinforces that disputed expert opinions on professional conduct ordinarily present factual issues that cannot be decided on summary judgment.