Pal v. Office of the Public Access Counselor — Appellate court holds that the Open Meetings Act does not authorize a right of action against the Public Access Counselor, barring cost recovery for delays

Case
Edgar D. Pal v. Office of the Public Access Counselor
Court
Illinois Appellate Court, First Judicial District
Date Decided
June 22, 2026
Docket No.
1-25-1564
Topics
Open Meetings Act; Statutory Interpretation; Administrative Remedies; Attorney’s Fees

Background

In February 2022, Edgar Pal filed a request for review with the Office of the Public Access Counselor (PAC) alleging that the Chicago Park District’s Board of Commissioners violated the Open Meetings Act during a closed session on November 10, 2021. Pal filed a second request in May 2022 regarding violations at an April 20, 2022 meeting. Both requests were fully briefed by August 2022, but the PAC did not issue determinations for more than two years, despite the Act requiring decisions within 60 days.

On January 24, 2025, having received no ruling and having followed up multiple times, Pal sued the PAC in circuit court, alleging the PAC violated the Open Meetings Act by failing to act within the statutory timeframe. One week after the PAC entered an appearance, it issued determinations confirming the Park District’s violations and ordering remedial action. Pal acknowledged his mandamus claim became moot but sought $460.09 in litigation costs under the Act’s cost-recovery provision.

The trial court denied Pal’s petition for costs. Pal appealed.

The Court’s Holding

The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of costs. The court held that Section 3 of the Open Meetings Act, which authorizes civil actions and cost recovery, does not provide a right of action against the PAC itself. Section 3 is designed to permit suits against public bodies that violate the Act’s transparency requirements, not against the administrative entity charged with reviewing allegations of such violations.

The court noted that the PAC, as a dispute resolver and facilitator, is not a “party” within the meaning of Section 3(d), which authorizes courts to assess costs against “any party” who fails to comply with the Act. The statute’s plain language and structure indicate that the General Assembly intended Section 3 to address violations by public bodies, not to create liability for the PAC’s administrative delays.

Although the court acknowledged that Pal had no statutory remedy for cost recovery against the PAC, it noted that parties facing PAC delays may pursue mandamus relief or other equitable remedies to compel timely action. The court observed that if the General Assembly wishes to provide civil recourse for PAC delays, that is a legislative matter.

Key Takeaways

  • The Open Meetings Act provides two separate remedial paths: direct civil suit against the public body (Section 3) or administrative review through the PAC (Section 3.5), and these are not interchangeable.
  • The PAC cannot be sued under Section 3 for its own violations of Section 3.5’s timing requirements; Section 3 applies only to claims against public bodies themselves.
  • Cost-recovery provisions under Section 3(d) do not apply to disputes with the PAC, as the PAC functions as a neutral reviewer rather than as a “party” to the underlying dispute.
  • Parties facing PAC delays may seek mandamus or other equitable relief to compel compliance, but statutory cost recovery is not available against the PAC under current law.

Why It Matters

This decision clarifies the remedial structure of the Open Meetings Act and establishes an important limitation on cost recovery in transparency disputes. It confirms that the PAC’s administrative review function shields it from civil liability under the Act, even when delays are substantial. For practitioners, the ruling underscores the importance of choosing the right defendant and statutory basis at the outset: a party seeking costs must sue the public body that violated the Act, not the PAC reviewing the allegation.

The decision also exposes a potential gap in statutory protections. Although Pal had no cost remedy against the PAC despite delays exceeding two years, the court suggested that mandamus relief remains available. The opinion signals that if the General Assembly views PAC delays as a systemic problem warranting a statutory fix—such as explicit cost liability for the PAC—legislative action would be required.

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