Background
Randall Behning was convicted after a bench trial of multiple sexual offenses involving his minor stepdaughter. The victim testified about repeated sexual conduct over an extended period, incidents involving Behning’s neighbor Kyle Peters, and Behning’s creation and possession of sexually explicit photographs. Law enforcement testified regarding the investigation, while Behning presented witnesses including Peters to challenge the victim’s credibility and account. The trial court found the victim credible, convicted Behning, and imposed an aggregate sentence of 36 years’ imprisonment. Direct appeal affirmed the conviction in 2015.
Following affirmance on direct appeal, Behning filed a post-conviction petition under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. At the second stage, with appointed counsel, an amended petition alleged trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by inadequately examining witness Kyle Peters, failing to adequately examine Detective Carla Carter, and failing to present testimony from Patricia Glees regarding forensic evidence and access to the computer allegedly containing the explicit photographs.
The Court’s Holding
The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed the circuit court’s dismissal of Behning’s amended post-conviction petition at the second stage. Applying the two-prong Strickland test for ineffective assistance claims, the court held that Behning failed to make a substantial showing of both deficient performance and resulting prejudice. Regarding the alleged inadequate examination of Peters, the court found that counsel’s strategic decisions about witness examination are entitled to substantial deference, and Behning’s bare assertions that counsel should have asked additional questions do not overcome this presumption. The court noted that counsel did challenge the State’s case and examined Peters regarding matters relevant to the defense.
As to the detective and Glees, the court held that even accepting Behning’s allegations as true, any additional testimony would have shown only that others may have had access to the computer—insufficient to establish that another person created or controlled the relevant files. The court observed that constructive possession can exist even where possession is joint or others have access. The record showed counsel did not ignore the access issue but argued the digital evidence did not establish exclusive control by Behning. The additional testimony would have merely supplemented an existing theory rather than transforming the defense or creating a reasonable probability of a different outcome.
Key Takeaways
- Trial counsel’s decisions regarding the scope and manner of witness examination constitute trial strategy entitled to substantial deference on post-conviction review.
- To overcome the presumption of sound trial strategy, allegations must be supported by more than assertions that counsel should have pursued different questioning or evidence presentation.
- Showing that others may have had access to evidence does not establish prejudice under Strickland without demonstrating a reasonable probability of a different trial outcome.
- At the second stage of post-conviction proceedings, a defendant must make a substantial showing of both deficient performance and resulting prejudice to advance to an evidentiary hearing.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces the challenging standard for obtaining post-conviction relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel claims. By emphasizing deference to trial strategy and requiring concrete showings of prejudice rather than speculation about alternative evidence, the court illustrates why such claims rarely survive second-stage dismissal. The holding signals that post-conviction petitions in sexual offense cases will not be advanced based on alternative forensic theories or suggestions that different witness examination might have produced more favorable results.
The case is particularly significant for practitioners because it demonstrates that even when trial counsel fails to present available evidence or thoroughly examine witnesses on potentially exculpatory topics, courts will not find ineffective assistance unless the petitioner establishes a reasonable probability the outcome would have been different. This sets a high bar for relief in factually-intensive criminal convictions where trial courts have assessed credibility and found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.