Background
Ladevon Donnell Pence pleaded guilty under a fully negotiated agreement to two counts of aggravated battery with a firearm. The charges alleged that he shot the same victim, K.C., in the chest and back. The circuit court imposed consecutive prison terms of 8 and 10 years, followed by three years of mandatory supervised release. Pence did not directly appeal.
On August 15, 2025, Pence filed a pro se petition for relief from judgment under section 2-1401(f) of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure. He asserted that his convictions and sentence were void, including because they violated the one-act, one-crime rule. Before the State answered or otherwise pleaded, the circuit court denied the petition on August 18, 2025.
The Court’s Holding
The Illinois Appellate Court, Fifth District, vacated the dismissal and remanded. A circuit court may not sua sponte dismiss a section 2-1401 petition before expiration of the usual 30-day period for the State to answer or otherwise plead.
Here, the court dismissed Pence’s petition only three days after filing, two of which were weekend days, and before the State had responded. Under People v. Laugharn, that dismissal was premature because it deprived the State of its allotted response period. The appellate court expressed no view on the merits of Pence’s voidness claims.
Key Takeaways
- A section 2-1401 petition cannot be sua sponte dismissed before the State’s usual 30-day pleading period expires.
- A premature dismissal must be vacated even if the petitioner focuses the appeal on the underlying merits.
- The remand permits the State to answer or otherwise plead; it does not resolve the petitioner’s substantive claims.
Why It Matters
The decision reinforces the procedural protection recognized in Laugharn: section 2-1401 proceedings cannot be short-circuited before the responding party has the time provided to plead. Trial courts must allow that period to run before dismissing an unopposed petition on their own initiative.