Background
Dakota Marcus Shults was charged with two counts of criminal sexual assault after an incident in which a 17-year-old victim alleged he sexually penetrated her—orally and digitally—while she was asleep and without her consent. The victim and defendant, who had been high school acquaintances, arranged to meet at a park through Facebook. After the victim arrived and smoked marijuana, defendant joined her. They sat in the back seat of defendant’s vehicle. The victim testified she fell asleep due to marijuana use and fatigue, and when she awoke, defendant’s penis was in her mouth and his fingers were in her vagina.
The victim immediately reported the assault to her father, who contacted her sister and police. She underwent a hospital examination and disclosed the assault to a sexual assault nurse examiner. DNA testing revealed a partial male DNA profile found on the victim’s underwear, from which defendant was not excluded; the profile was 170 times more likely to be from defendant or a male relative than a randomly selected male. At trial, defendant’s girlfriend testified he told her he had only touched the victim over her clothes, contradicting his defense theory of consent.
The jury convicted defendant on both counts. He received consecutive sentences of four years and five months on each count, totaling eight years and ten months’ imprisonment. On appeal, the Office of the State Appellate Defender moved to withdraw under the *Anders* standard, arguing no issue of arguable merit existed.
The Court’s Holding
The appellate court granted the State Appellate Defender’s motion to withdraw and affirmed the conviction. The court found that evidence of guilt was sufficient: the victim’s credible testimony that she did not consent and was asleep, corroborated by her immediate disclosure to family and medical examination, plus DNA evidence linking defendant to the crime, met the beyond-reasonable-doubt standard. Testimony from a single credible witness is sufficient for conviction even when contradicted by the defendant.
The court rejected defendant’s evidentiary challenges. The trial court properly excluded evidence that another male’s DNA was found on the victim’s sports bra under Illinois rape shield law (720 ILCS 5/115-7), because this evidence was irrelevant—the victim never alleged defendant touched her breasts or bra—and not admissible to show consent. The court also properly admitted the victim’s statements to the sexual assault nurse examiner regarding the assault under the medical treatment exception to hearsay (720 ILCS 5/115-13), as those statements were reasonably pertinent to diagnosis and treatment.
The critical issue was defendant’s request for jury instructions on consent. The court held that because criminal sexual assault under the applicable statute does not require proof that force or threat of force was used, consent instructions need not be given unless the defense raises a genuine factual issue about consent supported by trial evidence. Here, no such foundation existed: the victim consistently testified she did not consent and was asleep. The trial court’s response to the jury’s question asking which act constituted each count was proper and accurate.
Key Takeaways
- Consent instructions in Illinois sexual assault cases apply only to offenses where force or threat of force is an element of the crime; without that element, a defendant must present evidence creating a genuine factual dispute about consent to receive such an instruction.
- Circumstantial evidence that a victim voluntarily met the defendant or entered a vehicle is insufficient to raise a consent issue when the victim testifies she did not consent and was incapacitated or asleep.
- Illinois rape shield law (§115-7) bars evidence of another male’s DNA on the victim unless it directly relates to past sexual conduct with the accused and is offered on the consent issue; evidence of contact with other males unrelated to the charged crime is irrelevant and inadmissible.
- The medical treatment exception to hearsay (§115-13) broadly applies to a victim’s statements to medical personnel in sexual assault prosecutions, even when the statements include the victim’s account of the assault.
Why It Matters
This decision establishes important boundaries for consent defenses in Illinois sexual assault cases without a force element. By holding that circumstantial evidence of voluntary conduct (meeting the accused, entering a vehicle) cannot generate a consent issue absent affirmative testimony supporting consent, the court protects incapacitated or sleeping victims from having their convictions undermined by defense inferences divorced from actual evidence. The ruling clarifies that the defendant’s own contradictory statements to third parties (here, telling his girlfriend a sanitized version of events) do not create sufficient conflict to warrant jury instructions on consent.
The court also reinforced the scope of Illinois rape shield protections and the breadth of the medical treatment hearsay exception in sexual assault cases, making it clear that victims’ detailed disclosures to medical examiners are core evidence admissible to prove the assault. For prosecutors, the decision confirms that DNA evidence—even partial profiles providing “moderate support”—combined with credible victim testimony can meet the beyond-reasonable-doubt standard in sexual assault convictions.