People v. Thomas Jr. — Illinois appellate court affirms denial of postconviction ballistics testing

Case
The People of the State of Illinois v. Gerald L. Thomas Jr.
Court
Illinois Appellate Court, Fourth District
Judge
Justice DeArmond; Presiding Justice Steigmann (Illinois Supreme Court, 1989); Justice Doherty
Date Decided
October 27, 2026
Docket No.
No. 4-25-1396
Topics
Postconviction testing; Ballistics; Criminal procedure
Source
Read the full opinion

Background

Gerald L. Thomas Jr. was convicted after a bench trial of two counts of attempted first-degree murder, aggravated battery, and unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon. The charges arose from the October 2017 shooting of Manuel Pratt and Alonzo Rose. The trial court imposed an aggregate 86-year prison sentence, and Thomas’s direct appeal and prior collateral challenges were unsuccessful.

In May 2024, Thomas moved pro se for Integrated Ballistic Identification System (IBIS) testing under section 116-3 of the Illinois Code of Criminal Procedure. He argued that ballistic evidence recovered from Pratt could produce new, noncumulative evidence relevant to his actual-innocence claim, including evidence bearing on the witnesses’ accounts of whether a revolver was involved. The circuit court denied the request.

The Court’s Holding

The Illinois Appellate Court, Fourth District, affirmed. Section 116-3 permits requested fingerprint, IBIS, or DNA testing only when the evidence was not subject to that testing at trial, or when additional testing uses a method not scientifically available at trial and reasonably likely to yield more probative results.

The court held that Thomas did not meet those requirements. The ballistic evidence had already undergone some testing, and Thomas failed to identify an additional testing method that was unavailable when he was tried. He conceded that IBIS testing itself was available at the time of trial. His appellate assertion that further testing could establish whether a revolver was involved was forfeited because it had not been raised below; in any event, he did not contend that the proposed computer-based and “skid mark” tests were scientifically unavailable at trial.

Key Takeaways

  • Postconviction forensic testing under section 116-3 is statutory, not constitutional.
  • When evidence was previously tested, a movant must identify a newly available testing method with a reasonable likelihood of more probative results.
  • Merely seeking additional ballistics testing does not satisfy section 116-3 when the requested method was available at trial.

Why It Matters

The decision reinforces that section 116-3 imposes a technology-availability threshold for additional testing of previously tested evidence. A defendant must specifically connect the requested method to a scientific development unavailable at trial; a general claim that further testing could support innocence is insufficient.

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