Background
John Wells was convicted of first degree murder for the January 20, 2017, shooting death of Deandray Jackson. The jury found that Wells personally discharged a firearm that proximately caused Jackson’s death. The trial court sentenced Wells to 45 years’ imprisonment plus a mandatory 25-year firearm enhancement, for a total of 70 years to be served without sentence credit. The appellate court affirmed his conviction and sentence on direct appeal.
In August 2024, Wells filed a pro se petition under section 2-1401(f) of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure, asserting that his conviction and sentence were void. He argued that People v. Shumpert had invalidated the legislation creating first degree murder and that People v. Reedy had invalidated the truth-in-sentencing law. The circuit court granted the State’s motion to dismiss. On appeal, the Office of the State Appellate Defender moved to withdraw under Pennsylvania v. Finley after concluding that no arguably meritorious issue existed.
The Court’s Holding
The appellate court granted appointed counsel leave to withdraw and affirmed the dismissal. Although Wells filed his petition nearly six years after the final judgment—outside section 2-1401’s ordinary two-year limitations period—a genuinely void judgment may be challenged at any time. A judgment is void when the issuing court lacked jurisdiction or when the judgment rests on a facially unconstitutional statute that is void ab initio. Wells established neither ground.
Shumpert did not declare the first degree murder statute unconstitutional; it determined that the legislation creating first and second degree murder became effective on July 1, 1987. That statute was valid when Wells committed the murder in 2017. Reedy did invalidate an earlier public act containing truth-in-sentencing provisions for violating Illinois’s single-subject rule, but the legislature had already reenacted those provisions through Public Act 90-592, effective June 19, 1998. The truth-in-sentencing requirement was therefore valid and applicable to Wells.
The court also found no procedural error. The State responded to Wells’s petition within 30 days, the parties presented arguments at a hearing, and the circuit court ruled afterward, satisfying the procedural requirements governing section 2-1401 petitions.
Key Takeaways
- Shumpert addressed the effective date of the legislation creating first and second degree murder; it did not invalidate the first degree murder statute.
- Reedy’s invalidation of Public Act 89-404 did not undermine Wells’s sentence because Public Act 90-592 had validly reenacted the truth-in-sentencing provisions before his offense.
- A section 2-1401 petition filed beyond two years may attack a void judgment, but Wells’s conviction and sentence were not void.
Why It Matters
The decision distinguishes a statute once affected by an unconstitutional enactment from a statute that remained invalid when applied to a defendant. Neither Shumpert nor Reedy rendered the laws governing Wells’s 2017 offense and sentence void.
The order also confirms that section 2-1401(f) does not provide a way around the ordinary limitations period merely by labeling a judgment “void.” The petitioner must identify a jurisdictional defect or a judgment based on a facially unconstitutional statute. Because this is a Rule 23 order, it is nonprecedential except in the limited circumstances permitted by Rule 23(e)(1).