Background
Heather Pierson worked as an Illinois State Police dispatcher from 2000 until 2022. She alleged that, at annual meetings from 2018 through 2021, the agency required her to disclose family medical history, including information about heart disease, cancer, and diabetes, on workers’ compensation questionnaires.
After leaving the agency, Pierson brought a class action under the Illinois Genetic Information Privacy Act. She sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief. The circuit court dismissed the action, holding that the Act did not expressly waive the State’s sovereign immunity from damages and that Pierson lacked standing to pursue injunctive relief as a former employee.
The Court’s Holding
The appellate court affirmed. Although the Act defines “employer” to include the State and prohibits employers from requesting genetic information as a condition of employment, its private-right-of-action provision permits suit only against an “offending party.” That general wording did not clearly and unequivocally authorize monetary damages against the State.
The court held that making the State subject to the Act’s substantive restrictions is distinct from expressly consenting to damages litigation. The legislature could have specifically authorized damages against the State, as it had in other statutes, but did not do so here. Pierson forfeited any challenge to the dismissal of her injunctive and declaratory claims by not raising those issues on appeal.
Key Takeaways
- A statute’s inclusion of the State within a regulated class does not itself waive sovereign immunity from damages.
- A waiver of Illinois sovereign immunity must be clear, unequivocal, and stated in affirmative statutory language.
- The Act’s reference to an “offending party” was insufficient to authorize damages against the State.
Why It Matters
The decision limits damages actions under the Genetic Information Privacy Act against Illinois state agencies unless the legislature expressly authorizes that remedy. State employers may remain bound by the Act’s substantive requirements, but those obligations do not alone create a circuit-court damages remedy against the State.