Background
The McLean County circuit court entered a stalking no contact order against attorney Paul Berard in favor of Joshua Smull. Berard appealed that order and later moved to approve and certify a bystander’s report under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 323(c).
Berard scheduled his motion for hearing, but the circuit court found that he had not complied with Rule 323(c)’s timing requirements and appeared unprepared to argue the motion. Smull sought sanctions and submitted a fee affidavit seeking $2,040 for counsel’s work on the bystander’s-report motion and the sanctions request. The circuit court imposed sanctions under Rule 137 and awarded the requested fees, finding Berard’s conduct willful, not in good faith, and needlessly costly to Smull.
The Court’s Holding
The Fourth District affirmed. It held that the written sanctions order was sufficiently specific because it identified Berard’s motion to approve and certify the bystander’s report as the basis for sanctions and explained that he pursued the motion despite noncompliance with Rule 323(c), then appeared unprepared for the hearing.
The court forfeited Berard’s due-process argument because he did not develop it with reasoned analysis or supporting authority. It further held that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in finding a Rule 137 violation. Berard did not supply a transcript that could undermine the circuit court’s finding that he knew of his Rule 323(c) noncompliance. The fee affidavit and record also supported the $2,040 award.
Key Takeaways
- A Rule 137 order is sufficiently specific when it identifies the sanctioned filing and explains why the conduct warranted sanctions.
- Pursuing a procedurally defective motion while unprepared to argue it can support Rule 137 sanctions when it needlessly increases litigation costs.
- An appellant’s unsupported assertions and failure to provide a necessary hearing transcript will not establish error in a sanctions or fee award.
Why It Matters
The decision underscores that Illinois courts may use Rule 137 to shift reasonable fees caused by a litigant’s bad-faith pursuit of a filing. It also illustrates the importance of a complete appellate record and properly supported briefing when challenging discretionary sanctions.