Background
On March 19, 2020, Margaret McQuillen was driving southbound on Highway 151 near Anamosa when Clifford Takes, operating an eighteen-wheel semitrailer for West Side Transport, Inc., made an unprotected left turn across the southbound lane. Margaret’s vehicle collided with the semitrailer in an “underriding” collision—her car slid beneath the trailer, shearing off its roof, pillars, windshield, and side windows. Margaret suffered catastrophic injuries including severe traumatic brain injury, over one hundred skull fractures, and lacerations. She was revived after prolonged CPR and faces permanent neurological deficiencies.
Margaret’s parents sued Takes and West Side Transport for negligence. The jury heard seven days of evidence, including testimony from a digital forensics expert (for the defense, establishing Margaret may have been using Snapchat) and Grace Lubben (for the plaintiffs, testifying about how Snapchat actually works). The jury found the defendants 73% at fault and Margaret 27% at fault under comparative negligence principles. It awarded $35,793,475 in total damages, resulting in a judgment of $26,129,236.80 after the negligence reduction. The defendants appealed, arguing the trial court abused its discretion by permitting improper closing arguments.
The Court’s Holding
The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the district court judgment. The court held that trial courts have broad discretion in managing closing arguments and that appellate reversal is warranted only when improper argument was sufficiently prejudicial that “a different result would have been probable” absent the misconduct. Applying this standard, the court found no abuse of discretion on any of the defendants’ three arguments.
First, regarding the defendants’ complaint that plaintiffs’ counsel called lay witness Grace Lubben a “Snapchat expert,” the court found no abuse of discretion. Although Lubben was not formally qualified as an expert, her testimony about how Snapchat works was technical in nature. The court noted that calling her an “expert” on Snapchat was not misleading given the jury instructions clarified that expert witnesses should be treated like any other witness. Moreover, it was fair game for plaintiffs to distinguish Lubben’s actual Snapchat experience from the digital forensics expert’s admitted unfamiliarity with the platform.
Second, regarding arguments beyond the jury instruction specifications of negligence (e.g., speed limit violations, parking policy violations), the court held that while some arguments were improper, they were too minor a portion of the overall closing argument to warrant reversal. The written jury instructions properly limited the jury’s verdict grounds, and the trial court had admonished the jury that closing arguments are not evidence. The improper arguments formed no “inescapable theme” justifying a new trial.
Third, regarding the restriction on “time value of money” arguments, the court held error was not preserved because the defendants failed to move for mistrial before jury submission—they raised the issue only in their post-trial motion. Moreover, the court had not categorically prohibited time value of money discussion; it had only prohibited a specific PowerPoint slide, and the defense made a strategic choice not to pursue the argument differently.
Key Takeaways
- Trial courts receive broad discretion in determining the propriety of closing arguments and appellate courts defer substantially to the trial judge’s firsthand observations of jury reaction and context.
- A new trial is not required for improper closing argument unless the argument was sufficiently prejudicial that a different verdict would have been probable without it.
- Error preservation requires timely objections and motions for mistrial before jury submission; post-verdict motions are too late for closing argument challenges.
- Characterizing a lay witness with specialized knowledge as an “expert” on that knowledge may be permissible where the jury receives proper instructions on how to evaluate expert testimony.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces the principle that appellate courts give substantial deference to trial judges’ management of closing arguments, recognizing that judges who observe the trial firsthand are better positioned to assess context, jury reaction, and whether error was genuinely prejudicial. For practitioners, the decision clarifies that trial courts need not impose rigid prohibitions on closing argument scope if adequate curative measures exist (written jury instructions, jury admonitions, defense opportunity to respond). The decision also emphasizes that error preservation is not optional—waiting until post-trial motions to challenge closing arguments will result in waiver.
For catastrophic injury cases, the decision signals that courts will afford plaintiffs significant latitude in damages arguments and in calling witnesses to rebut expert testimony, even when characterizations strain the technical meaning of “expert.” The standard requiring reversal only when improper argument would probably change the result sets a high bar for appellate reversal, advantaging party autonomy and jury verdicts over appellate second-guessing of trial management.