Background
The Corcorans borrowed substantial sums from Permanent TSB in 2007, secured on investment properties. Following the 2008 financial crisis, they fell into arrears. In 2019, PTSB transferred the loans to Start Mortgages DAC, which appointed receivers in 2020. The Corcorans, proceeding without legal representation, initiated High Court proceedings challenging the legality of the loan transfer, the validity of the receiver appointment, and alleging fraudulent misrepresentation by PTSB regarding loan terms.
A High Court application to strike out the proceedings failed. In 2025, the Corcorans sought discovery of documents relating to the loan transfers. Quinn J. granted discovery of the first category of documents while refusing the second. The defendants then appealed the discovery order. In October 2025, the appellants offered to withdraw the appeal conditionally (requiring the Corcorans to withdraw their cross-appeal and sign a confidentiality undertaking). On 4 November 2025, appellants unconditionally withdrew the appeal, and the Corcorans—who withdrew their cross-appeal on 7 November—sought costs of the appeal.
The Court’s Holding
Justice Butler, for the three-judge panel, held that the Corcorans, as litigants-in-person who were entirely successful, are entitled to an award of costs against the appellants. The court rejected the appellants’ argument that their conditional settlement offer should preclude a costs award, finding the offer was both conditional and not (as initially characterized) an open offer. The unconditional withdrawal of the appeal one month before the scheduled hearing date, the court noted, would ordinarily entitle a successful party to full costs even if represented.
The court addressed a more complex question: whether litigants-in-person are entitled to recover “costs” simpliciter (as stated in s.169(1) of the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015) or only “outlays and expenses” as traditional common law held. Butler J. acknowledged that s.169(1) makes no distinction between represented and unrepresented parties and refers to entitlement to “costs” without qualification. However, she clarified that litigants-in-person remain unable to recover costs for purely legal work (drafting pleadings, conducting oral argument) that is the province of qualified lawyers, consistent with the regulatory purpose of the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015. A grey area exists for administrative and non-legal work (such as document preparation) that would be recoverable as part of legal costs if performed by solicitor staff, but this issue requires determination on taxation of the bill of costs.
Key Takeaways
- Litigants-in-person who are entirely successful in civil proceedings are entitled to an award of costs under s.169(1) of the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015, not limited to outlays and expenses only.
- A conditional settlement offer made in without prejudice correspondence, disclosed to the court in breach of privilege, does not defeat the entitlement of a successful party to costs where the conditions are not accepted.
- Withdrawal of an appeal late in the process (one month before hearing) does not preclude a costs award to the successful party, even where the party is unrepresented.
- Litigants-in-person cannot recover costs for purely legal work, but a grey area exists for administrative and non-legal preparatory work, to be determined on detailed taxation of the bill.
Why It Matters
This judgment represents a significant development in the treatment of litigants-in-person under Irish costs law. It marks the first occasion on which the Court of Appeal has squarely addressed whether the enactment of the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015—which refers to entitlement to “costs” without distinguishing between represented and unrepresented parties—changed the pre-2015 common law rule (established in *Dawson v Irish Brokers Association* [2002] IESC 36) that litigants-in-person could recover only outlays and expenses, not the cost of their own labour. Butler J. cautiously suggested that the statutory language may expand the entitlement but stopped short of a complete reversal, leaving the precise scope to be determined through taxation of costs. The judgment also emphasizes that careful disclosure restrictions apply to without prejudice settlement correspondence, particularly where a litigant-in-person is involved, and that courts should not be misled about the true nature and conditions of offers made during litigation.