DAA plc v Commissioner of Valuation — High Court considers whether Valuation Tribunal had jurisdiction to review the splitting of Dublin Airport into three separate rating units

Case
DAA PLC v The Commissioner of Valuation
Court
High Court (Ireland)
Date Decided
12 June 2026
Citation
[2026] IEHC 375
Topics
Rating and Valuation, Statutory Jurisdiction, Airport Infrastructure, Valuation Methods

Background

Dublin Airport is a large integrated complex of approximately 2,600 acres owned and operated by DAA Plc, handling around 85% of Ireland’s air traffic. Historically, the entire airport — including terminals, runways, car parks, and ancillary buildings — was treated as a single “relevant property” for rates purposes under the Valuation Act 2001, though different valuation methods were applied to component parts. In the 2019 county-wide revaluation, a valuation officer exercised the discretionary power under s.17(2)(b) of the 2001 Act to split Dublin Airport into three separate rateable units: the Main Airport (terminals, piers, taxiways, and runways), the Car Parks (24,567 spaces across 27 locations), and a miscellaneous range of External Buildings. The combined net annual value (NAV) ascribed to all three units was €186.55 million.

DAA lodged three separate appeals to the Valuation Tribunal, arguing that all parts of the airport were functionally integral and should remain a single relevant property valued on the contractor’s method. The consolidated appeals were heard over 21 days between September 2020 and September 2021. In June 2023 the Tribunal delivered decisions on two of the three appeals — the Car Parks and the External Buildings — but the Main Airport decision remains outstanding due to changes in the Tribunal’s constitution. In each decided appeal the Tribunal held that the s.17(2)(b) splitting decision was beyond its jurisdiction to review. It nonetheless adjusted the Car Parks NAV downward to €23.9 million (from the Commissioner’s €27.25 million) using a receipts and expenditure approach, and fixed the External Buildings NAV at €4,585,000 (marginally above the Commissioner’s €4,410,000) using the comparative method.

DAA declared dissatisfaction with both decisions and required the Tribunal to state cases for the High Court under s.39(5) of the 2001 Act. The cases were formally signed in December 2025 and filed in the Central Office in February 2026, with the hearing before Ms Justice Siobhán Phelan taking place in May 2026. Five questions of law were referred: (I) whether the Tribunal correctly held that it had no jurisdiction to hear an appeal against the s.17(2)(b) splitting decision; (II) whether the Tribunal correctly held that it could not examine whether that power was properly exercised; (III) whether the Tribunal erred in excluding risk factors when forecasting future income in the receipts and expenditure valuation of the Car Parks; (IV) whether the Tribunal erred in fixing the hypothetical tenant’s share at 20% without adequately reflecting accepted risk factors; and (V) whether the Tribunal erred in delivering decisions in the Car Parks and External Buildings appeals before delivering a decision in the linked Main Airport appeal.

The Court’s Holding

At the outset of its analysis, the Court set the scene for the five questions by recording that the Tribunal had, within its acknowledged jurisdiction, adjusted the Car Parks valuation to €23.9 million and the External Buildings valuation to €4,585,000, while declining to revisit the s.17 unit-splitting decision. The Court noted a significant preliminary observation: it accepted that it is “possible and even likely” that the division of Dublin Airport into three relevant properties would ultimately have no bearing on the overall or cumulative rateable valuation, particularly because Irish law — unlike UK law — expressly permits the Tribunal under s.37(4) of the 2001 Act to determine value by reference to whatever method or combination of methods it deems appropriate. The Court also drew attention to s.50, which expressly contemplates the application of the contractor’s method to a part only of a property, and to the fact that even before the 2019 split, the contractor’s method had never been applied to the car parks or external buildings.

The Court further identified a discrete question going to the scope of the Tribunal’s amalgamation power: whether s.37(2)(b)(v), which allows the Tribunal to amalgamate relevant properties that are the subject of two or more appeals and determine the value of the amalgamated property, applies only where a revision under s.28(4) has occurred or whether it extends to decisions made on a revaluation. This question is material because the 2019 restructuring was a revaluation, not a revision, and the answer bears directly on whether the Tribunal could effectively undo the Commissioner’s unit-splitting decision through the mechanism of amalgamation rather than by direct review of the s.17(2)(b) exercise.

The full resolution of each of the five questions is set out in the court’s substantive analysis which followed these preliminary observations. The court also noted, without adverse consequence for either party, that the elapsed time between the 2019 revaluation and the May 2026 High Court hearing — with the third appeal still undecided — does not conform to the spirit of the expedited referral procedure contemplated by s.39, even though no procedural objection was raised.

Key Takeaways

  • The Valuation Tribunal held, and the case stated brings before the High Court, the question of whether a s.17(2)(b) decision to split a single relevant property into parts falls within the Tribunal’s appellate jurisdiction under s.34 of the Valuation Act 2001 — a point of significant practical importance for large integrated rating assessments.
  • Irish rating law differs from UK law in a material respect: s.37(4) of the 2001 Act expressly allows the Tribunal to arrive at NAV by reference to any method or combination of methods it deems appropriate, so the mandatory use of the contractor’s method for airports that applies in the UK does not automatically apply in Ireland.
  • Even where a property was historically valued as a single unit, the contractor’s method need not govern its constituent parts; the Irish statute and past practice both contemplate different methodologies for different components of an integrated facility.
  • The scope of the Tribunal’s amalgamation power under s.37(2)(b)(v) — and whether it is confined to revision proceedings or extends to revaluations — remains a live question with direct relevance to how large multi-unit properties are challenged on appeal.
  • Significant procedural delays in rating appeals by case stated (here, seven years from revaluation to High Court hearing, with one of three linked appeals still undecided) underscore systemic pressures on the statutory framework, even where no formal time-limit objection arises.

Why It Matters

This case raises foundational questions about the architecture of Ireland’s rating valuation system for large, integrated infrastructure assets. The central jurisdictional issue — whether a ratepayer can challenge in the Tribunal not merely the quantum of a valuation but the antecedent decision to treat a single economic unit as multiple separate properties — has implications well beyond Dublin Airport. If the Commissioner’s unit-splitting power under s.17(2)(b) is effectively unreviewable on appeal, operators of airports, ports, utilities, and other integrated national infrastructure will have limited recourse against a decision that can materially alter their rates exposure by disaggregating a single complex into components amenable to higher-yielding valuation methods.

The case also clarifies the boundaries of the receipts and expenditure methodology as applied to ancillary commercial operations — particularly how risk and the hypothetical tenant’s share should be reflected where the operator has no practical alternative to occupying the premises. For rating practitioners and valuation professionals, the High Court’s analysis of ss.17, 34, 37, and 50 of the 2001 Act will provide authoritative guidance on unit-of-valuation disputes and the permissible scope of methodological challenge before the Valuation Tribunal.

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