Background
AIB commenced summary proceedings in 2015 against Martin and Marie Doran concerning liabilities under credit agreements made in 2007 and 2010. In April 2018, the High Court entered summary judgment for €209,696.23 in respect of the 2010 facility, but sent the claim concerning the 2007 facility to plenary hearing. The court accepted the special endorsement of claim as the plaintiff’s statement of claim and gave the defendants liberty to file a defence within three weeks. No defence was delivered.
AIB also began two enforcement proceedings against Mr Doran in 2017. Its interests in the loans and securities later transferred to Everyday Finance DAC. Although the defendants consented to substitution, Everyday’s substitution application in the judgment proceedings was repeatedly adjourned before an order was made in December 2023. In 2025, the defendants applied to dismiss all three proceedings for want of prosecution and inordinate and inexcusable delay.
The Court’s Holding
Ms Justice Bolger struck out the judgment proceedings and both enforcement proceedings for delay. The substitution applications counted for little in assessing whether the litigation had been actively prosecuted: they were procedural, the defendants consented to them, Everyday delayed more than two years before commencing the process, and it gave no explanation for four adjournments between July 2022 and December 2023.
The Court rejected Everyday’s contention that the April 2018 order placed responsibility for progress on the defendants. The order gave them liberty, rather than directing them, to file a defence. While the defendants’ failure to do so meant they were exposed to a default-judgment motion, it did not permit the plaintiff to take no meaningful step for years. Everyday could have sought judgment in default of defence after the three-week period expired, but first threatened such a motion only after the defendants had brought their dismissal applications.
Nor could Everyday justify its inactivity by relying on the Belfry proceedings or on its expectation that the defendants would resist progress. There was no demonstrated agreement to hold these proceedings pending the other litigation, and the Belfry proceedings settled in July 2021. Applying the principles in Kirwan v Connors, the Court held that specific prejudice need not be proved; in any event, the defendants’ age, the need for oral evidence, fading recollection, and the stress and uncertainty of decade-long litigation supported dismissal.
Key Takeaways
- A plaintiff remains responsible for advancing its case even where a defendant has not filed a defence.
- A substitution application may carry limited weight where it is procedural and itself pursued slowly.
- Other litigation does not justify putting proceedings on hold without communication and agreement or an order.
- Long delay may warrant dismissal without proof of specific prejudice.
Why It Matters
The decision is a practical application of the Supreme Court’s recent emphasis on timely litigation. It confirms that defendants are not required to prompt plaintiffs to prosecute claims, and that a plaintiff cannot rely on anticipated procedural resistance as a reason for prolonged inactivity.
For loan purchasers and other assignees, the case also highlights the need to complete substitution promptly and then take substantive steps to progress or enforce the proceedings. Delay in regularising title to continue litigation will not necessarily protect a claim from dismissal.