Background
Kerstin Mey served as President of the University of Limerick from October 2021. In May 2023, she attended a meeting of the Oireachtas Public Accounts Committee (PAC) regarding a controversial property purchase (the Rhebogue transaction). When asked why the Chief Corporate Officer was absent, Mey explained that he had a long-standing personal engagement. The CCO had taken approved annual leave but was in Dublin the night before and participated in preparation meetings and briefly with the delegation after the PAC meeting, attending to personal family matters that day.
A protected disclosure was made in August 2023 alleging Mey had misled the PAC about the CCO’s absence. The University appointed Caroline Jenkinson, an independent investigator, who conducted interviews and issued a report in April 2024. Ms Jenkinson found that Mey and the CCO had provided truthful and accurate information, and that the answers given to PAC were factual and correct. The University accepted the report and the investigation appeared closed.
However, in May 2024, at a second PAC meeting (PAC2), acting President Prof Kilcommins provided a different account of the CCO’s absence. The University’s Disclosures Group then recommended reopening the Jenkinson investigation to examine this new information. Mey and the University settled their disputes in June 2024, with Mey accepting a demotion and less favourable contractual terms. In July 2025—over a year after settlement—the University informed Mey it was requesting Jenkinson to re-investigate the same issues, prompting Mey to seek an injunction.
The Court’s Holding
Justice Bolger granted the plaintiff’s application for interlocutory injunctive relief, restraining the University from proceeding with the reopened investigation. The Court found a serious question to be tried that the settlement agreement precluded continuation of the impugned process. Clause 20 of the settlement warranted that the University would not proceed with disciplinary action “in relation to any matters to the date of this Agreement” except where new evidence emerges warranting investigation for serious misconduct or fraud. The Court reasoned that by the time the parties signed the settlement on 14 June 2024, the University was aware of what had been said at PAC2 and the concerns it raised—these were matters existing before the settlement date. There is a serious question that Mey agreed to the settlement, including her demotion and reduced contractual terms, to resolve all matters up to that date, creating an irremediable wrong if the University were allowed to proceed with investigation into pre-settlement conduct.
The Court also addressed the University’s argument that it has a statutory duty under section 6A of the Protected Disclosures Act 2014 to diligently follow up on protected disclosures. Justice Bolger found this issue to be novel—no Irish case law addresses whether an employee can settle matters arising from a protected disclosure, or whether an employer’s statutory obligations persist indefinitely after an investigation is completed and accepted. Section 6A does not expressly contemplate re-examination of previously investigated matters, and it is arguable that once a prima facie determination was made and investigated, the statutory obligations identified by the University were substantially addressed. The Court declined to hold that the statute creates an unlimited, never-ending obligation to revisit closed investigations.
The balance of convenience favoured granting the injunction. Allowing the investigation to proceed would permit the University to disregard express settlement terms for which the plaintiff sacrificed valuable contractual rights and career position. An injunction addresses this irremediable harm, whereas any prejudice to the University from delay is remediable in damages or through the trial process itself.
Key Takeaways
- Settlement agreements can operate to restrict an employer’s ability to pursue investigations into matters existing before the settlement date, even where a protected disclosure framework is involved.
- An employer cannot circumvent settlement terms by characterizing a reopened investigation as a statutory obligation separate from disciplinary action when the substance remains identical.
- The Protected Disclosures Act does not, on its face, authorize indefinite re-investigation of the same allegations after an investigation has been completed, accepted, and the matter formally closed.
- Irish courts will grant interlocutory injunctions to restrain threatened breaches of settlement agreements where the balance of convenience favors protection of contractual rights over speculative future statutory obligations.
Why It Matters
This decision provides important guidance on the interplay between settlement agreements and statutory whistleblower protections in Irish law. Employers and employees must now consider carefully how settlement language addresses protected disclosure investigations. The judgment signals that Courts will interpret settlement warranties strictly, and that the Protected Disclosures Act—while robust in protecting initial investigations—does not give employers carte blanche to re-open settled matters indefinitely. The ruling also clarifies that an employer’s statutory duty to follow up on protected disclosures has limits: once a thorough investigation is conducted and accepted by the institution, further re-examination of identical allegations cannot automatically be justified by invoking section 6A.
For practitioners, the case underscores that settlement agreements concerning employment disputes should clearly define the scope of any reservation for future investigations, and that parties cannot assume statutory obligations override contractual commitments without explicit statutory language to that effect. The novel legal question left for trial—whether section 6A prevents settlement of matters arising from a protected disclosure—will likely influence future employment settlements involving whistleblower allegations and may prompt legislative clarification of the Act’s interaction with contractual settlement rights.