Background
Agnieszka Nowak appealed a High Court judgment from 10th April 2025 that had extended the time for the Courts Service of Ireland to deliver its defence by seven days under O. 27, r. 9 of the Rules of the Superior Courts. The extension followed Nowak’s motion seeking judgment in default of defence. Nowak, representing herself, advanced the appeal on the ground that the High Court misinterpreted the Rules.
On 11th May 2026, the Court of Appeal dismissed Nowak’s appeal entirely (neutral citation [2026] IECA 81). Justice McDonald invited her to make written submissions within 14 days if she wished to argue against the ordinary rule that the successful defendant should recover its appellate costs. Nowak delivered submissions on 22nd May 2026 advancing five distinct arguments to displace the statutory presumption of costs under s. 169 of the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015.
The Court’s Holding
The Court held that none of Nowak’s arguments justified displacing the statutory presumption that costs follow the event. Justice McDonald systematically rejected each ground: (1) her stated intention to apply for Supreme Court leave to appeal was irrelevant to costs of the already-determined appeal; (2) that the appeal involved Rules interpretation did not make it a case of “public importance” exempted from ordinary costs rules, and Nowak was advancing private interests, not public concern; (3) while the defendant’s breach of the Rules might have been relevant to costs in the High Court, it was irrelevant to appeal costs once Nowak chose to appeal and lost; (4) her unsubstantiated allegations of judicial “cover-up” were “manifestly unfounded, completely unjustified and utterly unacceptable” and could not rebut the presumption; and (5) her argument that Supreme Court judgments cited in the Court’s decision were “invalid” lacked any proper basis.
The Court also rejected Nowak’s “equality of arms” argument that costs should be limited to mere expenses because she was unrepresented, holding that nothing in s. 169 of the 2015 Act or the case law permitted courts to restrict costs recoverable from pro se litigants in that manner. The Court stated that such an approach would leave defendants with no ability to recover costs even where unrepresented parties expose them to significant additional expense by advancing meritless appeals.
The Court ordered that Nowak pay the respondent’s appellate costs, to be adjudicated in default of agreement. However, execution of the costs order was stayed for 21 days from perfection to allow time for a Supreme Court leave application, with the stay to continue if such application is lodged.
Key Takeaways
- An unsuccessful appellant must bear appellate costs even if the opposite party committed procedural breaches in the lower court; the focus is on appeal success or failure, not underlying merits.
- Appeals involving Rules of Court interpretation are not categorically “cases of public importance” exempt from the ordinary costs rule; something more than procedural novelty is required.
- Pro se (self-represented) litigants are not insulated from standard costs awards when they lose appeals; they face the same cost consequences as represented parties.
- Unsubstantiated allegations of judicial impropriety or “cover-up” lack the factual foundation necessary to displace statutory cost presumptions and were characterized by the Court as “absurd and scandalous.”
- Judicial independence is protected by constitutional oath and confirmed by the Court’s strong reaffirmation that judges are entirely independent office holders not influenced by the party status of litigants.
Why It Matters
This judgment significantly clarifies Irish appellate costs doctrine under the 2015 Act. It establishes that s. 169’s presumption that costs follow the event is robust and resistant to displacement absent compelling circumstances. For pro se litigants in particular, the decision confirms they assume the same cost risk as represented parties when they appeal. The case reinforces that appellate costs are determined by appellate success, not by the substantive merits of the underlying claim or alleged procedural wrongs by the other side.
Justice McDonald’s emphatic rejection of Nowak’s allegations of judicial impropriety—delivered in stark language about the judiciary’s constitutional independence and the need for factual foundation—serves as a cautionary statement about the consequences of making unfounded accusations against courts. The decision will likely constrain future attempts by unsuccessful appellants to avoid costs awards based on merely raising interpretive issues or alleging systemic bias without concrete evidence.
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