Background
Agnieszka Nowak was employed as a trainee management accountant with Intesa San Paolo Vita S.P.A. and was dismissed by letter dated 20 August 2015, signed by the company’s Chief Financial Officer. In September 2015 she filed multiple complaints with the Workplace Relations Commission: a race-based equal pay claim under the Employment Equality Act 1998, an unfair dismissal claim under the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977, and a complaint regarding notification of a change to her employment terms. Because her claim predated the commencement of the Workplace Relations Act 2015, the unfair dismissal complaint fell to be determined by the Employment Appeals Tribunal (EAT).
The proceedings accumulated a lengthy procedural history. The EAT initially declined jurisdiction over the unfair dismissal claim in February 2017 on the basis that s. 101(2) of the 1998 Act barred a parallel claim once a matter was referred to the Equality Tribunal. That decision was overturned on appeal through the Circuit Court and, ultimately, the High Court (McDermott J.), which referred the matter back to the EAT for substantive hearing. The EAT heard the case over three days in early 2019. On the final hearing day, Nowak raised a new argument — never previously advanced — that her dismissal was legally ineffective because the CFO lacked authority to terminate her employment. The EAT rejected that contention, found the dismissal was effective (relying on principles of agency, implied authority, and subsequent ratification by the CEO), and held on the merits that the dismissal was not unfair.
Nowak appealed to the Circuit Court, seeking to set aside the EAT determination and a declaration that she remained “effectively employed.” Before the Circuit Court she again argued that the court lacked jurisdiction because, she contended, no effective dismissal had occurred. His Honour Judge Shannon rejected that preliminary argument, held the Circuit Court clearly had jurisdiction under s. 11 of the Unfair Dismissals (Amendment) Act 1993, and awarded costs against Nowak on the preliminary issue. Nowak appealed both rulings — the jurisdiction finding and the costs order — to the High Court.
The Court’s Holding
Mr. Justice O’Donnell dismissed both appeals. On jurisdiction, the court held that the statutory framework is self-contained and unambiguous: s. 11(1) of the Unfair Dismissals (Amendment) Act 1993 grants the Circuit Court jurisdiction to hear appeals from EAT determinations, and the plaintiff herself engaged that jurisdiction by lodging her unfair dismissal claim and subsequent notice of appeal. The court applied the principle that a party cannot approbate and reprobate — Nowak had asserted throughout the entire process that she had been dismissed and that the dismissal was unfair; she could not at a late stage reverse that position to deny the very legal foundation on which she was relying.
The court further held that the EAT’s finding of an effective dismissal was well-founded. Applying established agency law principles, it accepted that the CFO had at minimum implied authority to terminate Nowak’s employment and that, in any event, the CEO’s subsequent ratification of both the final written warning and the termination itself put the matter “beyond reasonable argument.” There was no legal or factual basis advanced to displace those conclusions.
On costs, the court applied ss. 168 and 169 of the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015 and the principles from Chubb European Group SE v. Health Insurance Authority [2022] 2 I.R. 734 and Higgins v. Irish Aviation Authority [2020] IECA 277. The company had been entirely successful on the preliminary jurisdiction issue before the Circuit Court, and Nowak’s argument that costs should await final resolution of all issues — including the substantive merits — was rejected. The court upheld the Circuit Court’s costs order in favour of the company.
Key Takeaways
- A claimant who invokes the statutory unfair dismissal regime under the 1977 Act cannot later contest the jurisdiction of the EAT or the Circuit Court by arguing no legally effective dismissal occurred — the approbate/reprobate rule precludes such inconsistency.
- Circuit Court jurisdiction to hear EAT appeals is expressly and exclusively conferred by s. 11(1) of the Unfair Dismissals (Amendment) Act 1993; once an appeal is lodged, that jurisdiction is engaged.
- A dismissal effected by a senior officer without express authority can nonetheless be valid on grounds of implied authority and, independently, by ratification through subsequent conduct of a more senior officer.
- Under the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015 framework, costs may properly be awarded on a discrete preliminary issue even where substantive proceedings remain pending; there is no general rule requiring costs to await final determination of all matters.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces a fundamental procedural discipline in Irish employment litigation: a claimant who elects the statutory unfair dismissal route — and pursues it through multiple layers of appeal over years — cannot belatedly reframe proceedings by denying the very dismissal that founds the claim. The judgment offers clear guidance on the limits of jurisdictional challenges to the EAT and the Circuit Court, and confirms that the self-contained statutory code of the Unfair Dismissals Acts does not permit litigants to selectively invoke and then repudiate its mechanisms.
The case is also a practical illustration of the costs regime under the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015. By confirming that costs on a successful preliminary point can be awarded immediately — without waiting for the substantive outcome — the decision signals that deploying jurisdictional arguments as a delaying or complicating tactic carries real cost risk for the party that fails on those points. The judgment was delivered concurrently with a related ruling in a plenary discovery application bearing citation [2026] IEHC 383.