P.M. v. DPP — High Court refused to stop prosecution despite blameworthy delay

Case
P.M. v. The Director of Public Prosecutions
Court
High Court (Ireland)
Date Decided
20 July 2026
Citation
[2026] IEHC 493
Topics
Prosecutorial delay, juvenile justice, summary disposal, prohibition

Background

P.M. was 15 when he allegedly participated in a February 2022 incident on Henry Street, Dublin, involving group violence against an injured party. He was identified from CCTV and interviewed in March 2022, admitting his presence but denying criminal involvement. He was ultimately charged with violent disorder and assault causing harm in September 2024, shortly after turning 18.

Four co-accused who were still children when charged remained before the Children Court after it accepted jurisdiction under section 75 of the Children Act 2001, despite the DPP’s recommendation of trial on indictment. Because P.M. had aged out, he was sent forward to the Circuit Criminal Court. He sought to prohibit the prosecution, arguing that State delay deprived him of the opportunity for summary disposal, child-specific sentencing options, and anonymity protections.

The Court’s Holding

Ms Justice Siobhán Phelan found inordinate and blameworthy delay that breached P.M.’s constitutional right to trial with due expedition. The principal evidence concerning him was substantially complete by March 2022, yet the file was not sent to the DPP until three days before his eighteenth birthday. General references to workload, operational pressures, the continuing investigation of other suspects, and the Youth Diversion Programme did not satisfactorily explain the failure to progress his case while he remained a child.

The Court nevertheless refused to prohibit the prosecution. The treatment of the younger co-accused established a reasonable possibility—but not more—that the Children Court would have accepted jurisdiction over P.M.’s case. Losing that opportunity and the corresponding 12-month maximum custodial sentence amounted to prejudice, but it did not meet the exceptional threshold required to stop prosecution of serious charges. The Circuit Court must sentence according to P.M.’s individual culpability and circumstances, including that he was a child when the alleged offences occurred, while any anonymity prejudice could be addressed through a Gilchrist-type reporting restriction.

Key Takeaways

  • Authorities owe a heightened duty of expedition when investigating and prosecuting alleged offences committed by children.
  • A reasonable possibility of lost summary disposal under section 75 constitutes some prejudice, but does not ordinarily justify prohibiting prosecution without exceptional additional prejudice.
  • An adult sentencing court must account for the accused’s age and maturity at the time of the alleged offence; culpability does not increase merely because the accused aged out before trial.

Why It Matters

The decision applies the Supreme Court’s demanding standard for aged-out prosecutions while recognizing that comparator co-accused can provide meaningful evidence of a lost opportunity for summary disposal. Even where prosecutorial delay is constitutionally blameworthy and materially changes the available procedure, prohibition remains exceptional.

The judgment also identifies less drastic means of addressing prejudice: individualized sentencing can reflect childhood culpability, and a reporting-restriction order can mitigate the loss of statutory anonymity.

⬇ Download the original opinion (PDF)Archived from the court's official source.
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