Background
While Dr. Sharon Elrai Price was serving as head of Public Health Services at Israel’s Ministry of Health during the COVID-19 pandemic, Yosefa Barak Tamir published posts about her on social-media accounts. The posts included derogatory descriptions of Elrai Price’s family, including calling it a “crime family,” and claims that her son had not been vaccinated against COVID-19.
Elrai Price sued under Israel’s Defamation Prohibition Law over twelve specific publications. The Bat Yam Magistrate’s Court found that all but one constituted defamation, that the claims concerning Elrai Price’s son were baseless and false, and that Barak Tamir had published the statements with intent to cause harm. It rejected the statutory defenses of truth and good faith. The court awarded NIS 143,566 in damages without proof of loss—twice the statutory maximum under section 7A(c)—plus NIS 16,500 in costs and attorney’s fees. It also ordered removal of the posts and enjoined further publications about the son’s vaccination status and republication of the statements at issue.
The Tel Aviv-Jaffa District Court dismissed Barak Tamir’s appeal under Civil Procedure Regulation 148(b), adopting the trial court’s factual findings and conclusions, and awarded a further NIS 10,000 in costs and fees. Barak Tamir then sought permission for a third-tier appeal, principally arguing that the District Court’s abbreviated reasoning caused a miscarriage of justice. After changing counsel, she also sought to file an amended, expanded application.
The Court’s Holding
Justice Daphne Barak-Erez denied the request to amend. A change of legal representation does not by itself justify amending a pleading, particularly where the proposed application was longer, introduced arguments absent from the original filing, and expanded the dispute rather than merely organizing or clarifying existing claims. The considerable time elapsed since the District Court’s judgment and the original application further weighed against amendment.
The Court also denied permission to appeal. A third-tier appeal is reserved for cases presenting a question of principle or requiring review to prevent a miscarriage of justice. The application presented no principled question, and the Court found no defect in the District Court’s use of Regulation 148(b) to adopt the trial court’s findings and conclusions. Barak Tamir’s objections to Elrai Price’s representation by the state had already been conclusively resolved in an earlier proceeding. Given that Barak Tamir repeatedly disseminated defamatory publications about a public employee without establishing a legal defense, the Court found no plausible miscarriage of justice. Because no response on the merits had been requested, it made no costs order.
Key Takeaways
- An appellate court may use Regulation 148(b) to adopt a trial court’s findings and conclusions without providing more extensive independent reasoning.
- Replacing counsel ordinarily does not justify amending an appeal application, especially when the proposed amendment adds new arguments or broadens the dispute.
- Disagreement with fact-bound defamation rulings does not warrant a third-tier appeal absent a question of principle or a demonstrated risk of miscarriage of justice.
Why It Matters
The decision leaves intact substantial statutory damages and injunctive relief for repeated social-media defamation directed at a senior public-health official and her family. It underscores that public controversy surrounding government policy does not excuse unsupported factual claims about a public employee’s relatives.
The ruling also reinforces the Supreme Court’s narrow approach to third-tier civil appeals and confirms that the streamlined reasoning expressly authorized for intermediate appellate courts is not, without more, a denial of justice.