Background
The parties entered into three loan agreements in 2018, 2021, and 2024, under which Shimon and Hedva Lavi mortgaged their home to Galam Investments Group Ltd. In October 2025, Galam commenced enforcement proceedings to realize the mortgages, alleging that the L avis owed approximately NIS 3 million plus default-related charges. After the Enforcement Registrar denied their request for a stay and directed them to the competent court, the Lavis filed an action in the Beersheba District Court seeking cancellation of the loan agreements and liens and prevention of foreclosure.
The Lavis alleged that Galam operated without the required financial-services license and violated the Fair Credit Law, including through disclosure failures, unlawfully excessive interest, fraud, and misrepresentation. The District Court stayed the enforcement proceedings pending judgment, finding genuine questions concerning the agreements and amounts advanced, a prima facie issue regarding excessive interest and the Fair Credit Law’s application, and a balance of convenience strongly favoring the Lavis because foreclosure would remove them from their home.
Galam sought leave to appeal and separately asked to introduce documents that it said established advances totaling NIS 2.8 million. It argued that the District Court had relied on an incomplete record, undervalued delay and alleged bad faith, and improperly granted an indefinite injunction without requiring security.
The Court’s Holding
Justice Ruth Ronnen treated the application as an appeal and allowed it only in part. The Supreme Court declined to disturb the stay itself. It held that the District Court permissibly found that the claim’s prospects were “not necessarily on the low side,” properly weighed the parties’ conduct and the delay in seeking relief, and correctly concluded that the balance of convenience favored preserving the home pending adjudication.
Although the Lavis acknowledged receiving NIS 500,000, the amount actually advanced remained central to the dispute. On the existing record, the Court could not conclude that repayment of the undisputed amount would necessarily require foreclosure. Premature realization of the home could therefore cause irreversible harm, while Galam’s loss from delayed enforcement was compensable in money and did not outweigh the potential harm to the Lavis.
The Court nevertheless held that the District Court erred by failing to address security. Civil Procedure Regulation 96 generally requires both a personal undertaking and security for interim relief, absent special reasons for an exemption. The case was remanded for the District Court to exercise its discretion on that issue. The Supreme Court also denied Galam’s request to introduce new evidence on appeal, explaining that Galam could ask the District Court to reconsider the interim relief or its terms in light of any changed evidentiary record. No costs were awarded.
Key Takeaways
- An appellate court will ordinarily defer to a trial court’s fact-sensitive decision granting interim relief, particularly after an evidentiary hearing.
- Potentially irreversible loss of a residence may outweigh a lender’s compensable harm from delayed foreclosure, even where some principal is undisputed.
- A court granting interim relief must address the presumptive security requirement and identify special reasons if it exempts the applicant.
- New evidence bearing on an existing interim order ordinarily should be presented through a motion for reconsideration in the trial court, not introduced for the first time on appeal.
Why It Matters
The decision preserves meaningful judicial review of disputed home-mortgage enforcement where the legality and amount of private lending remain unresolved. It also confirms that the importance of preventing an unnecessary foreclosure does not eliminate procedural protections for the lender.
For practitioners, the ruling underscores two distinct requirements: develop the evidentiary record promptly in the trial court, and ensure that any interim order expressly addresses security, including the applicant’s means and the competing harms if an exemption is considered.