Background
A receiver was appointed in enforcement proceedings to sell property belonging to Yigal and Ronit Mosari because of Yigal Mosari’s debt. Seeking to redeem the debt and release that property, the Mosaris obtained financing from Avraham Sharon Investments Ltd., a nonbank lender controlled and managed by David Benji. The lender ultimately advanced less than the amount originally contemplated, and the property was later sold through enforcement proceedings for less than its value.
The Mosaris sued the lender and Benji for the resulting losses, alleging that they had breached a commitment to provide enough financing to discharge the debt and release the property. During the litigation, the Tel Aviv-Jaffa District Court, without opposition, temporarily stayed separate enforcement proceedings brought by the respondents against another Mosari property used as the family home. After the case was transferred to the Jerusalem District Court, that court dismissed the action, finding that the reduction in the loan amount had been agreed by the parties. It then lifted the stay under Regulation 100(1) of the Civil Procedure Regulations, 2018. The Mosaris sought leave to appeal that ruling and requested a further interim stay.
The Court’s Holding
Justice Ruth Ronnen denied leave to appeal without requesting a response from the respondents. Regulation 100(1) establishes the default rule that interim relief expires when judgment is entered unless the court orders otherwise. The Court found it unnecessary to decide whether expiration occurs automatically or requires a judicial order because the respondents had applied to dissolve the stay and the District Court had granted that application under the regulation.
Although Regulation 100(1) gives a court discretion to depart from the default rule, that discretion does not replace the unsuccessful plaintiff’s obligation to file a properly reasoned application for interim relief pending the filing or determination of an appeal under Regulations 145(b)-(c). The Mosaris had filed no such application in the District Court. The Supreme Court therefore upheld the ruling that the original stay expired upon entry of judgment and also denied the interim-relief request submitted with the leave application. It emphasized that the Mosaris remained free to seek a stay pending the filing of their intended appeal under Regulation 145(b), without expressing any view on the merits of such a request. No costs were awarded because no response had been requested.
Key Takeaways
- Under Regulation 100(1), interim relief ordinarily expires when the trial court enters judgment unless the court directs otherwise.
- A plaintiff who loses at trial must separately seek and justify interim relief pending appeal under Regulation 145; the trial-stage order does not simply continue by default.
- The Supreme Court did not decide whether expiration under Regulation 100(1) is automatic, nor did it rule on the merits of any future request to stay the sale of the Mosaris’ home.
Why It Matters
The decision draws a procedural line between interim relief preserving the status quo during trial and relief sought after an adverse final judgment. Even when enforcement concerns a family home and the alleged harm from sale may be irreversible, the losing party must use the designated post-judgment procedure and present a properly supported request.
The ruling also leaves open the broader interpretive question whether an interim order expires automatically upon judgment. Practitioners should not rely on that uncertainty: after judgment, they should promptly seek relief under Regulation 145 if protection is needed during the appeal period.