Background
The appellant, a victim injured in the 1996 Dizengoff Center terror attack in Tel Aviv, filed a lawsuit in 2024, approximately 28 years after the event. The suit, brought against the Palestinian Authority (PA) and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), was based on Israel’s recently enacted Victims of Terrorism (Exemplary Damages) Law, 5784-2024.
The appellant did not sue for compensatory damages for his injuries, but instead sought the fixed NIS 5 million in exemplary (punitive) damages provided for by the new law. The claim’s basis was that the PA and PLO were “rewarders of terror” because they made ongoing salary payments to the terrorist who perpetrated the attack and to his family. The Jerusalem District Court dismissed the lawsuit at the outset, finding that the claim was barred by Israel’s seven-year statute of limitations for torts. The victim appealed this dismissal to the Supreme Court.
The Court’s Holding
The Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision authored by President Isaac Amit, dismissed the appeal and affirmed the lower court’s judgment. The Court held that the 2024 Exemplary Damages Law does not create an entirely new cause of action that restarts the statute of limitations for old attacks. It pointed to Section 4 of the law, which explicitly states that its provisions “shall apply to a claim… that has not yet become statute-barred.” The Court reasoned that if the legislature had intended to revive expired claims, this language would be superfluous.
The Court rejected the appellant’s central argument that the PA’s ongoing payments constituted a “continuing tort,” which would mean the limitations period would only begin after the *last* payment was made. The Court determined that the cause of action against a “rewarder” of terror is not a standalone behavioral wrong. Instead, it is inextricably linked to the original, one-time event of the terror attack and the damage it caused. The “power to sue” the rewarder arises at the moment of the *first* payment. Since subsequent payments do not alter the nature of the claim or the amount of fixed damages, they do not create new, separate causes of action.
Because the underlying claim for the 1996 terror attack had long been time-barred, the Court concluded that any related claim under the new law, including one against the party rewarding the act, was also time-barred. The clock started to run when the first payment was made, and the seven-year period had long since passed.
Key Takeaways
- Israel’s 2024 Victims of Terrorism (Exemplary Damages) Law does not revive civil claims for terror attacks that were already barred by the statute of limitations when the law was enacted.
- The act of rewarding terrorism through continuous payments is not considered a “continuing tort” that repeatedly resets the statute of limitations with each payment.
- The statute of limitations for a civil claim against a “rewarder of terror” begins to run from the date of the first payment made in connection with the terrorist act, as this is when the full cause of action crystallizes.
- A claim for exemplary damages under the 2024 law requires proof of damage (specifically, death or permanent disability) resulting from the terror attack; it is not a purely behavioral tort that is independent of the attack’s outcome.
Why It Matters
This decision significantly curtails the retroactive reach of the 2024 Exemplary Damages Law, clarifying that it is not a vehicle for victims of decades-old terror attacks to bring new claims where the right to sue has already expired. The ruling establishes a clear and final starting point for the statute of limitations in these cases, tethering it to the initial actions following the terror attack rather than to ongoing payments that may continue for years.
The judgment provides a definitive analysis of how classic tort law principles, particularly the concepts of “continuing torts” and the accrual of a cause of action, apply within the unique framework of modern counter-terrorism legislation. It strikes a balance between the law’s stated deterrent purpose and the fundamental legal principle of finality that is embodied in statutes of limitation.