Background
The petitioner (identified only as “Ploni” under court anonymization) filed two applications in May 2026 seeking restraining orders under the Prevention of Stalking Law, 5762-2002, against welfare and municipal officials in his city. In the first proceeding (רע”א 36439-06-26), he alleged that two social-care workers were persecuting him, damaging his relationships with his wife, family, and community, defaming him, and transmitting false reports to welfare services — including a report that he had endangered his daughter’s life in the course of her medical treatment. In the second proceeding (רע”א 36636-06-26), he sought an order against the city’s mayor, alleging that municipal welfare and education officials acting under the mayor’s authority were interfering with his daughter’s medical care, harming her reputation, and threatening to remove her from school.
Both applications were rejected on the same day they were filed (May 24, 2026) or shortly thereafter by the Ramle Magistrate Court (Judge D. Shoham). In the first case the Magistrate Court found, among other things, that the petitioner had not supported his application with a properly sworn affidavit — his document lacked a signature before an authorized affidavit officer — and that the respondents appeared to be acting within their lawful duties. In the second case the court found that the allegations did not satisfy the statutory conditions for a stalking restraining order. The Lod Central District Court dismissed both appeals: the appeal in the second proceeding was dismissed the same day it was filed (May 26, 2026) under Civil Procedure Regulations 138(a)(1) and (5); the appeal in the first proceeding was dismissed after a hearing on June 9, 2026.
These two Supreme Court petitions were the latest in a series of at least eight similar leave-to-appeal applications the petitioner had filed within recent months, all involving restraining-order requests under the Prevention of Stalking Law against welfare, social work, and care personnel in his city. Every one of those prior applications had been dismissed at every level. A previous Supreme Court decision (רע”א 69492-04-26, Justice Kanafi-Steinitz) had already warned the petitioner in explicit terms that his conduct — litigating before eight different tribunals across three judicial districts on the same subject — constituted an abuse of court process.
The Court’s Holding
Justice Kasher dismissed both leave-to-appeal applications without requiring responses from the respondents. Applying the settled standard for “third-tier” leave to appeal, the Court held that such leave is granted only in exceptional cases raising a principled legal question of general importance beyond the parties’ private dispute, or where denial would cause a miscarriage of justice. Neither criterion was met: the petitioner’s arguments were entirely confined to his own personal circumstances, he himself raised no question of broader legal significance, and no miscarriage of justice would result from dismissal.
Beyond the threshold issue, the Court stated that the lower courts had also been correct on the merits. The Prevention of Stalking Law is not the appropriate legal vehicle for grievances against public authorities exercising statutory powers. Where municipal welfare or social workers make reports or take actions they believe fulfill their legal obligations, the proper remedies lie in administrative law proceedings or, where children’s matters are involved, before the Youth Court — not in a stalking-order application. This principle, the Court emphasized, had been explained to the petitioner repeatedly by multiple tribunals.
Finding that the petitioner’s repeated filings amounted to an abuse of court process, the Court exercised its power under Regulation 151(c) of the Civil Procedure Regulations, 5779-2018, to impose costs payable to the State Treasury. The Court noted a structural factor enabling the conduct: Regulation 20(30) of the Court Fees Regulations, 5767-2007, exempts stalking-law proceedings from filing fees entirely, removing the ordinary financial disincentive against frivolous applications. The petitioner was ordered to pay NIS 1,000 per petition — NIS 2,000 in total — described as “moderate” given the circumstances, with an explicit warning that future similar filings risk higher sanctions.
Key Takeaways
- The Prevention of Stalking Law, 5762-2002, does not provide a remedy against public officials or welfare workers acting pursuant to their statutory duties; such complaints must be channeled through administrative proceedings or specialized courts (e.g., Youth Court).
- Third-tier leave to appeal in Israel (district court having already reviewed the magistrate) is granted only where a principled legal question of general importance is raised or a miscarriage of justice would otherwise occur; purely personal grievances do not qualify.
- Courts may impose costs payable to the State Treasury — not merely to the opposing party — against litigants who engage in serial, frivolous proceedings constituting abuse of process, even where those proceedings carry no filing fees.
- The absence of court fees in stalking-law proceedings (under Regulation 20(30) of the Court Fees Regulations) was identified by the Court as a structural factor that may facilitate the filing of unmeritorious applications, since there is no financial “seriousness filter.”
Why It Matters
This decision illustrates the Israeli Supreme Court’s firm boundary between the Prevention of Stalking Law — a protective remedy designed for interpersonal harassment — and disputes with governmental or welfare authorities. The ruling reaffirms that perceived overreach by social workers, municipal officials, or care providers must be challenged through administrative review or specialized family/youth proceedings, not through stalking-order applications that were never designed for that purpose. Practitioners advising clients in conflicts with child-welfare or social-services agencies should note that the stalking-law route is explicitly foreclosed.
The case also has significance for court administration and access-to-justice policy. By flagging the fee-exemption under the Court Fees Regulations as a potential enabler of abusive litigation in this statutory context, Justice Kasher implicitly invites legislative or regulatory attention to whether that exemption should be conditioned or qualified. More immediately, the decision demonstrates that Israeli courts will escalate cost sanctions — including Treasury-directed awards — against repeat filers who persist after explicit judicial warnings, even when individual petitions are filed pro se.