Background
The petition challenged the Central District Attorney’s June 11, 2026 decision to close the investigation into an October 7, 2018 karting accident at Beit Berl. Ofek Shalom, then approximately 11 years old, was injured in the accident. The closure was the third such decision, following two successful appeals that had led to additional investigative work. The prosecution advised that the closure could be appealed within 60 days and that the criminal case would become time-barred on October 7, 2026.
On August 2, 2026, the petitioners sent the District Attorney a letter labeled “exhaustion of remedies,” arguing that the evidence justified prosecution and that the nearly eight-year investigation had been exceptionally prolonged. They contended that Ofek had suffered significant permanent disability and that closing the case shortly before expiration of the limitations period was extremely unreasonable. On September 14, the District Attorney declined to change the closure decision and explained that the letter had not been processed as a statutory appeal under Section 64 of the Criminal Procedure Law because the petitioners had not submitted it as one.
The petitioners then asked the High Court of Justice to annul the closure, require the authorities to explain why the four private respondents should not be prosecuted, and direct the prosecution to exercise its authority under Sections 9(c)(2) and 9(c)(3) of the Criminal Procedure Law to extend the limitations period.
The Court’s Holding
The Court unanimously dismissed the petition in limine. Section 64 provided a statutory avenue to appeal the closure decision to the legally designated authority, but the petitioners had submitted an “exhaustion of remedies” letter instead of using that procedure. Their two earlier successful appeals did not justify departing from the rule that the Court ordinarily will not entertain a petition when an alternative remedy remains available.
The request concerning the limitations period was also dismissed for failure to exhaust remedies. Before seeking judicial intervention, the petitioners were required to ask the competent authorities to grant the requested relief under Section 9. The petition and its attachments showed that they had not done so.
Although the appeal deadline had passed, the Court noted that the petitioners could request an extension under Section 65. It stated that the relevant authorities were expected to consider that request in light of the petitioners’ timely “exhaustion of remedies” letter, which contained arguments that would also have appeared in a statutory appeal. Because no response had been requested from the respondents, the Court made no order for costs.
Key Takeaways
- A letter seeking “exhaustion of remedies” does not substitute for the statutory appeal available under Section 64 of the Criminal Procedure Law.
- Prior successful appeals in the same investigation do not excuse a petitioner from pursuing the statutory remedy available against a later closure decision.
- A request for judicial intervention concerning extension of a criminal limitations period is premature unless the petitioner first asks the competent authority for that relief.
Why It Matters
The decision reinforces the High Court’s threshold rules governing challenges to prosecutorial decisions: parties must use the designated statutory process and first present requested relief to the competent administrative authority. Even urgent timing concerns near the expiration of a limitations period do not dispense with those requirements.
At the same time, the Court preserved a possible procedural route for the petitioners by highlighting Section 65 and directing attention to their timely letter when any request to extend the appeal deadline is considered. The Court did not decide whether the evidence warranted prosecution, whether the closure was reasonable, or whether the limitations period should be extended.