Background
This case arises from a long-running class action saga against Bezeq, Israel’s dominant telecommunications carrier. In November 2015, representative petitioners Michal Sokolover and Alon Tzadok filed an initial class action certification request alleging that Bezeq had unlawfully obstructed implementation of the wholesale telecommunications market reform while abusing its monopoly position and engaging in unjust enrichment. That first proceeding was certified with Bezeq’s consent in March 2019. In March 2018, the same petitioners filed a second certification request (the subject of this appeal) based on similar allegations but covering additional acts and a later time period — namely, from the filing of the first request to the filing of the second.
Shortly after the second request was filed, Bezeq sought a stay of proceedings owing to a parallel criminal investigation into the events at issue. The Attorney General intervened and in March 2019 the district court stayed the proceedings pending a final decision on whether criminal indictments would be filed, a stay that eventually lasted until May 2024. During the stay, however, the Competition Authority issued significant monetary sanctions against Bezeq and its then-CEO for deliberate interference with the wholesale market reform. In October 2019 the petitioners moved to amend the second certification request in two respects: (1) to add 18 new respondents — 16 former Bezeq officers and 2 outside consultants — on theories of personal aiding-and-abetting liability; and (2) to introduce newly available evidence, including the Competition Authority’s findings. Because the stay was still in effect, the district court deferred ruling on that motion.
After criminal indictments were filed and the criminal proceedings progressed, the Attorney General announced in May 2024 that the stay was no longer necessary. When the district court suggested in June 2024 that the petitioners simply file a fresh certification request, the petitioners objected that a new filing would face a statute of limitations bar. Following Bezeq’s response to the amendment motion filed in June 2025, the district court (Judge Rami Chaimovitch) on July 23, 2025 granted the request to add new evidence but denied the request to add the 18 individual respondents, reasoning that doing so would create an entirely new claim properly pursued in a separate proceeding. The petitioners sought leave to appeal that partial denial.
The Court’s Holding
Justice Ofer Grosskopf denied the petition for leave to appeal. The court reaffirmed that trial courts enjoy broad discretion over case-management decisions — including rulings on requests to amend class action certification applications — and that an appellate court will intervene only where the decision is contrary to law or results in a miscarriage of justice. No such extraordinary circumstances were present here.
On the merits, the court acknowledged that the amendment motion was filed at an early procedural stage and assumed (without deciding) that the petitioners could not have moved earlier. Nevertheless, adding 18 individual respondents would not advance the resolution of the existing disputes; it would materially expand the litigation. Although the officers’ conduct and Bezeq’s conduct share a common narrative, personal liability under section 12 of the Torts Ordinance (New Version) — the aiding-and-abetting provision — requires separate proof for each individual, including the requisite mental element of intent or awareness, and a showing that each person’s specific acts formed an integral and significant link in the chain of events giving rise to the tortious harm. Examining that for 18 different people who held different roles, acted during different sub-periods, and performed different acts would substantially broaden the factual and legal inquiry beyond the existing proceeding, which is focused solely on Bezeq’s corporate liability.
The court also rejected the argument that the statute of limitations concern compelled a different outcome. While the court recognized the unusual situation created by years of court-ordered stays, it resolved the limitations problem directly: for purposes of sections 15 and 16 of the Limitation Law, 5718-1958, the period from the filing of the amendment motion (October 23, 2019) to the date of this decision shall be treated as a period during which an action was filed against the individual officers that was dismissed for a reason that does not bar a fresh action against them. This tolling mechanism eliminates the limitations obstacle, leaving the petitioners free to commence a new and separate proceeding against the officers. No costs were awarded, given that the petition was not frivolous.
Key Takeaways
- Adding a large group of individual respondents on distinct personal-liability theories (aiding and abetting under section 12 of the Torts Ordinance) to an existing class action against a corporate defendant constitutes the introduction of a substantively new claim, not a permissible amendment — even if the underlying factual narrative overlaps.
- Appellate courts apply a highly deferential standard to trial-court decisions on amendment requests in class actions, intervening only when the ruling is contrary to law or causes a miscarriage of justice.
- Where a court-ordered stay has elapsed for years, rendering a fresh filing seemingly time-barred, the Supreme Court can and will invoke the tolling provisions of sections 15–16 of the Limitation Law to preserve the petitioners’ ability to sue the additional parties in a new proceeding — thereby eliminating any statute-of-limitations prejudice from denying the amendment.
- A class action certification request in Israeli competition law brought against a corporate monopolist does not automatically encompass personal antitrust or tortious liability of individual officers; such claims require a separate legal and evidentiary framework and ordinarily must be pursued independently.
Why It Matters
The decision draws a clear boundary in Israeli class action practice: the liberal approach to amendments does not permit litigants to graft qualitatively different claims and parties onto an existing proceeding simply because they share a background story. Courts must weigh the actual impact on the scope of litigation, and adding personal-liability claims against numerous individuals will almost always tip that balance against amendment. For plaintiff-side class action practitioners, the ruling underscores the importance of identifying all potential defendants at the outset rather than relying on the amendment mechanism to expand the cast of parties years later.
Equally significant is the court’s pragmatic use of statutory tolling to neutralize the limitations problem rather than forcing the petitioners into an all-or-nothing choice. By treating the period of the stayed amendment request as suspended litigation time under sections 15–16 of the Limitation Law, the Supreme Court avoids permanently extinguishing claims that were effectively on hold through no fault of the petitioners — while still maintaining the structural integrity of the existing proceeding. The decision also carries an implicit rebuke of prolonged delay: Justice Grosskopf acknowledged that the proceedings have dragged on far longer than desirable and called on the district court to accelerate both this class action and the parallel first class action.