Background
In July 2021, Acton Properties, L.L.C. leased a one-bedroom Louisville apartment to Lalana Fedorschsk for $525 per month. From the outset, Fedorschsk encountered persistent problems: pest and squirrel intrusions (including squirrels chewing through her internet cable after entering through an unrepaired exterior hole), recurring sewage and plumbing failures, and an inadequate mailbox. Landlord addressed some issues but Fedorschsk testified that the holes allowing squirrel access were never sealed. She declined to renew the lease and vacated in July 2022.
At a pre-move-out walk-through, Landlord presented a handwritten “Walkout Conditions Statement” listing alleged damage and $450 in management fees. Fedorschsk signed the document but added written notations disputing specific items and stating she would only “mail a response” to the management-fee demand — she did not agree to pay them. Landlord subsequently invoiced her $920 (after applying her $525 deposit), including plumbing costs, cleaning, and management fees billed at $150 per hour. Fedorschsk filed a Small Claims complaint to recover her deposit; Landlord countered with a fraud claim seeking $1,445 in ordinary damages plus $30,000 in compensatory and $25,000 in punitive damages. The case was transferred to Jefferson Circuit Court.
After a three-day jury trial in January 2025, the jury found that Fedorschsk had not failed to comply with her duties under the lease or the Kentucky Uniform Residential Landlord Tenant Act (URLTA). The trial court entered judgment awarding her $525 plus interest and denied Landlord’s subsequent motion for a new trial. Landlord appealed, also arguing that the trial judge should have recused based on alleged ex parte communications with Tenant’s counsel.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeals affirmed on all grounds. Before reaching the merits, the court found that Landlord’s opening brief materially violated Kentucky Rules of Appellate Procedure (RAP): it lacked ample record citations (including virtually no references to the video trial record despite quoting witness testimony), omitted the required preservation statements, and provided an inadequate statement of authorities. The court declined to dismiss the appeal outright — noting this was the first time before the court on these violations — but issued a formal admonishment to counsel and reviewed the preserved issues for manifest injustice only, reserving de novo review solely for the recusal question.
On recusal, the court applied a de novo standard and rejected Landlord’s claim that the trial judge engaged in ex parte communications or demonstrated disqualifying bias. Tenant’s “letter” filed with the clerk’s office had been served on opposing counsel, making it a court filing rather than an ex parte communication. The brief exchange between Tenant’s counsel and the judge while Landlord’s counsel retrieved her calendar was immediately relayed to Landlord’s counsel and did not constitute a prohibited off-record communication. The court further found that the trial judge’s adverse reactions to the recusal motion — which the judge called “completely baseless” after Landlord’s counsel admitted she had not even watched the video record before persisting with the motion — did not rise to the level of impermissible bias.
On the merits, the court found no manifest injustice in the trial court’s denial of Landlord’s motion for a directed verdict under KRS 383.580. Landlord argued that Fedorschsk’s signature on the damage listing was “conclusive evidence” of its accuracy, barring any recovery. The court rejected this both on preservation grounds (the argument was not raised until after the jury verdict) and on the merits: Fedorschsk had expressly dissented in writing on the damage statement itself and in a follow-up letter, satisfying KRS 383.580(5)’s requirement for written dissent and preserving her right to contest the charges.
Key Takeaways
- A tenant who signs a landlord’s post-tenancy damage listing but contemporaneously notes written objections to specific charges is not barred under KRS 383.580(5) from later contesting those charges and seeking return of the security deposit.
- Kentucky appellate courts will review unpreserved errors only for “manifest injustice” when a party’s brief systematically fails to cite the record or identify where issues were preserved — a consequence the court treated here as an additional sanction alongside a formal admonishment.
- Judicial recusal requires proof of facts “calculated seriously to impair the judge’s impartiality”; adverse rulings, a judge’s pointed courtroom demeanor, and a litigant’s subjective belief of bias are insufficient to compel disqualification under KRS 26A.015(2).
- An LLC landlord cannot recover intentional infliction of emotional distress damages as a matter of law; individual managing members who are not named as party-plaintiffs cannot benefit from such claims.
- The court flagged that Landlord’s counsel had committed similar appellate briefing violations in prior cases and expressly warned that future leniency should not be expected.
Why It Matters
This decision offers a practical reminder that Kentucky’s security-deposit statute, KRS 383.580, does not automatically convert a tenant’s signature on a damage listing into an unassailable concession. Tenants who write contemporaneous objections — even informally, on the document itself — preserve their statutory right to dispute charges and pursue recovery of withheld deposits. Landlords cannot weaponize the signature requirement to foreclose review of contested deductions when the tenant has plainly dissented in writing.
The opinion also continues the Kentucky Court of Appeals’ recent campaign for strict compliance with appellate briefing rules. By downgrading Landlord’s standard of review to manifest injustice as a direct consequence of briefing failures, the court demonstrated that RAP violations carry real substantive costs — not merely procedural scolding. The court’s pointed footnote about counsel’s identical conduct in a prior appeal signals that dismissal or other sanctions remain on the table in future proceedings involving the same attorney.