Background
On May 26, 2021, Matthew Gadd was injured in a collision at an intersection in Florence, Kentucky, when his vehicle was struck by one driven by 16-year-old Jasiah Tanner, who held only a learner’s permit. The impact was modest — no airbags deployed, no party required immediate medical treatment, and both vehicles were driven away. Gadd visited the emergency room the next day for lumbar strain and was later diagnosed by orthopedist Dr. David Sower with lumbar radiculopathy from a herniated disc. Weeks after Sower’s diagnosis, an MRI revealed spinal lesions that led to a diagnosis of metastatic lung cancer; Gadd died on December 31, 2021, from stage-four lung cancer. He had filed his negligence suit against Tanner and his underinsured-motorist carrier, Kentucky Farm Bureau, before the cancer diagnosis.
Following Gadd’s death, his estate — represented by his widow Nancy Gadd as executrix — was substituted as plaintiff. The UIM claim against Kentucky Farm Bureau was bifurcated, and a jury trial on the negligence claim against Tanner commenced on June 12, 2025. The Estate called family members and Gadd’s employer to describe his pre- and post-accident activity levels and pain, and presented the video deposition of Dr. Sower. Sower testified that, based on Gadd’s patient history and x-rays taken roughly two months after the accident, the back pain and radiculopathy were caused by the collision. The Estate presented no witness who described how the accident occurred, and it introduced no evidence of what Tanner did or failed to do.
When the trial court asked whether the Estate had additional witnesses, counsel responded it did not, and the court declared the plaintiff had rested. The Estate did not object. Only after Tanner moved for a directed verdict — arguing the Estate had presented no evidence of duty or breach — did the Estate reveal it had planned to elicit that testimony from Tanner herself, expecting to call her after she took the stand as the defense’s own witness. The trial court gave the Estate overnight to brief the issue, then denied the motion to reopen and granted the directed verdict.
The Court’s Holding
The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed on all three issues. On the question of reopening, the court held the trial court did not abuse its discretion under CR 43.02. The video record unambiguously showed the Estate had rested; it failed to object when the court so declared; and it sought to reopen only after Tanner had specifically identified the evidentiary gaps in her directed-verdict motion. Permitting a plaintiff to cure identified deficiencies after the opposing party reveals its grounds for relief would undermine the orderly conduct of litigation. The court noted that Kentucky’s Supreme Court has held reopening is appropriate only in “extraordinary cases to prevent a manifest injustice” where a party had ample opportunity to present evidence during its case-in-chief.
On directed verdict, the court found the Estate presented a complete absence of proof on the elements of duty and breach. Although Dr. Sower opined that Gadd’s back condition was caused by the accident, that evidence addressed causation only in a general sense and said nothing about what Tanner did or did not do. Because Kentucky does not recognize a universal duty of care untethered to specific facts, and because the Estate introduced no facts about how the collision occurred, any jury finding of negligence would have rested on speculation. The court also noted the Estate failed to establish the statutory threshold of $1,000 in medical expenses required by KRS 304.39-060(1)(b) to maintain a tort claim in a motor-vehicle case covered by Kentucky’s no-fault framework.
On costs, the court affirmed the trial court’s award of $3,917.13 to Tanner under CR 54.04 and CR 68. The trial court had properly excluded Tanner’s expert witness fees — which lack specific statutory authorization — and the remaining itemized costs (deposition transcripts, litigation support, a death certificate, a medical canvass, and an expedited hearing transcript) were either ordinarily recoverable by a prevailing party or directly incident to the trial proceedings. The court found no abuse of discretion.
Key Takeaways
- A plaintiff in a Kentucky negligence case who rests without presenting evidence of the defendant’s duty or breach cannot reopen its case simply because the defense motion for directed verdict reveals those gaps — doing so after the opposing party shows its hand is too late absent extraordinary circumstances.
- Kentucky does not recognize a universal duty of care; plaintiffs must introduce facts about how an accident occurred to give a trial court or jury a basis to assess what legally cognizable duty existed and whether it was breached.
- In Kentucky motor-vehicle tort cases governed by the no-fault statute, a plaintiff must establish either $1,000 in medical expenses or a qualifying injury threshold (such as permanent impairment or a fracture) to recover pain-and-suffering damages — failure to prove that threshold is an independent basis for directed verdict.
- Expert witness fees are not recoverable as litigation costs under CR 54.04 absent specific statutory authorization, even when the prevailing party made a valid offer of judgment under CR 68.
Why It Matters
This decision serves as a sharp reminder of the order-of-proof obligations embedded in Kentucky’s civil rules. Defense practitioners can take note that CR 43.02 and CR 50.01 together create a meaningful checkpoint: once a plaintiff rests — even inadvertently — and the defense moves for directed verdict on identified grounds, the plaintiff ordinarily cannot cure those defects by reopening its case. The opinion reinforces that trial courts have broad discretion to hold parties to their procedural choices, and appellate courts will not second-guess that discretion absent a showing of manifest injustice.
For plaintiffs’ counsel in Kentucky auto-accident cases, the opinion underscores the importance of sequencing: if the defendant or a defense witness is the key source of liability evidence, that witness must be called during the plaintiff’s case-in-chief — not left to chance after the plaintiff rests. The case also highlights the continuing force of Kentucky’s no-fault threshold requirements; even where causation evidence exists, failure to prove the statutory minimum in medical expenses can doom an otherwise viable claim.