Background
Steven Lee McStoots, who experienced psychosis and depression, was housed in 2013 in the Correctional Psychiatric Treatment Unit at the Kentucky State Reformatory. He had escalating self-harm episodes, including repeated head-banging, and an extensive history of requiring restraints. On January 16, 2013, officers handcuffed and shackled him during a severe psychotic episode. After he collapsed while being escorted to another cell, he was placed face-down and strapped to a cell bunk in a five-point restraint device. An officer said he was not breathing, although several others responded that he was. Twelve minutes after McStoots left his cell, psychiatrist Donna T. Smith ordered the restraints removed and emergency responders called. Resuscitation was unsuccessful.
McStoots’s mother, Dorothy Canary, filed a wrongful-death action alleging negligence and gross negligence in Oldham Circuit Court on November 19, 2014. After her death, Brent Caldwell, administrator of McStoots’s estate, was substituted. The circuit court entered two summary judgments: one held that Warden Clark Taylor and Unit Administrator Danny Perry had qualified immunity for discretionary functions and were not negligent in performing ministerial functions; the other found CorrectCare-Integrated Health, Inc. and Smith not negligent. Gross negligence was not at issue on appeal. The Estate also appeared to have abandoned its claims against Anna Valentine and Correctional Officer Jeff George and confined its appellate arguments to Taylor, Perry, and Smith.
The Estate’s expert, Richard Sobel, M.D., attributed McStoots’s death to asphyxiation likely caused or contributed to by the prone restraint and failures to intervene. Sobel called the face-down restraint “incomprehensible” under the circumstances and testified that Smith breached the applicable standard of care.
The Court’s Holding
Writing for a unanimous panel, Judge McNeill explained that official immunity presents a legal question reviewed de novo once material facts are resolved. But when immunity requires factfinding, weight and credibility are for the factfinder, with factual findings reviewed for clear error under CR 52.01 and upheld when supported by substantial evidence. Ordinary CR 56 summary-judgment principles govern non-immunity issues. Under Yanero, Meinhart, and Sheehy, the defendant first must establish a discretionary act within official authority; only then does the burden shift to the plaintiff to show bad faith. Negligent performance of ministerial duties receives no qualified immunity.
The court affirmed immunity for decisions to use five-point restraints and judgments about their duration and escalation under CPP 9.1(II)(G)(1)(k)(1) and (m). Those decisions were discretionary, within the officers’ employment, and the Estate offered no bad-faith argument. It reversed as to three ministerial provisions, with only Taylor and Perry potentially implicated. Under CPP 9.1(II)(G)(1)(h), Taylor’s approval was undisputed, but nothing showed the additionally required approval of a medical or mental-health professional; a jury must decide breach, causation, and damages. Under CPP 9.1(II)(A)(5), admissions and the Critical Incident Review Team’s finding that no cell-entry-team member had been trained established breach of the training duty, leaving causation and damages for a jury.
The court also found sufficiently preserved the claim under CPP 9.1(II)(G)(1)(d)(1), which prohibits mechanical restraints as punishment. Although it was unclear whether that exact provision was presented below, CPP 9.1 and psychologist Julie Barber’s deposition were repeatedly cited. Barber testified that she objected to the restraint and that Perry “wanted to teach [Mr. McStoots] a lesson, and that he was going to five-point him.” Breach, causation, and damages on that provision were remanded for jury determination.
Finally, the court reversed summary judgment for CorrectCare and Smith. Neither private party qualified for official immunity, and Smith clearly owed McStoots a common-law duty. Sobel’s testimony and report created jury questions on the remaining negligence elements. The Estate need not try its entire case at summary judgment; the court expressed no opinion on the ultimate proof of causation or any other element.
Key Takeaways
- Qualified immunity was affirmed only for discretionary restraint, duration, and escalation decisions, not for the three identified ministerial duties.
- The training duty was breached by admission; the approval and anti-punishment claims still require jury findings on breach.
- The punishment issue’s preservation was circumstance-specific, resting on repeated reliance on CPP 9.1 and Barber’s deposition.
- CorrectCare and Smith face ordinary negligence principles, not the discretionary/ministerial immunity framework.
Why It Matters
The opinion separates the legal immunity inquiry from factual negligence determinations and emphasizes that ministerial status ends the immunity analysis rather than authorizing a court to resolve negligence itself. It also illustrates how policy language, admissions, expert evidence, and the particular appellate record determine which claims survive.
The decision is designated “NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.” Its remand does not establish liability or damages; it restores specified claims against Taylor and Perry and the negligence claims against Smith and CorrectCare for further proceedings.