Background
On December 29, 2017, Jilianne Warner was struck from behind by a tow truck operated by Christian Worley, rendering her quadriplegic. Worley was traveling 65-70 mph toward a traffic light, lost focus, failed to see the red signal, and his brakes locked when he attempted to stop. Warner had less than two seconds to react. Worley was employed by Midnight Recovery, Inc., which held an independent servicer agreement with GEICO Casualty Company to provide roadside assistance to GEICO insureds.
Warner filed a negligence action in June 2018 seeking compensatory and punitive damages against Worley, Midnight Recovery, and various 911 operators. The trial court initially dismissed the 911 defendants under the public duty doctrine. GEICO was added as a defendant on the theory that GEICO was vicariously liable for Worley’s negligence because tow truck operation constitutes an inherently dangerous activity. The trial court denied GEICO’s motion for summary judgment, reasoning that the “inherently dangerous nature” exception to the general rule against vicarious liability for independent contractors applied to tow trucks under Kentucky Revised Statutes § 189.670.
At trial, the jury found Worley and Midnight Recovery were on a GEICO roadside assistance call at the time of the collision and awarded Warner $163,973,761.14 in damages. A second jury subsequently determined Midnight Recovery was an independent contractor rather than GEICO’s agent, precluding punitive damages. The trial court entered judgment holding GEICO jointly and severally liable.
The Court’s Holding
The Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s judgment against GEICO on vicarious liability. The court affirmed the general rule that an entity is not vicariously liable for the negligence of an independent contractor’s employees. The court acknowledged that a limited exception exists at common law where injury results from the independent contractor’s failure to exercise due care regarding work that is intrinsically dangerous, as codified in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 427.
However, the court held that the “inherently dangerous” exception does not apply to tow truck operation. The court reasoned that Worley’s negligence—crashing at high speed into a stopped vehicle due to driver inattention—created a new risk not inherent in or normal to the proper operation of a tow truck. The negligence was not the type of risk the inherently dangerous doctrine contemplates. The court emphasized that a tow truck can be operated safely without probable injury, and that outside influences or circumstances cannot transform an ordinarily non-dangerous activity into one that is inherently dangerous. The court further held that KRS 189.670, which expresses public policy regarding heavy freight-carrying motor trucks, does not apply to tow trucks, which are specifically designed to enhance public safety by clearing disabled vehicles from roadways.
Accordingly, GEICO was entitled to summary judgment and is not vicariously liable for Worley’s negligence. The court also affirmed dismissal of the 911 operators under the public duty doctrine, finding no special relationship existed between the operators and Warner individually.
Key Takeaways
- An employer is not vicariously liable for an independent contractor’s negligence unless the work involves an inherently dangerous activity and the injury results from the contractor’s failure to take precautions against the danger inherent in the work itself.
- Negligence that creates a new risk unrelated to the ordinary performance of the work—such as driver inattention at a traffic light—falls outside the inherently dangerous exception.
- Tow truck operation, even when performed by employees of an independent contractor, is not an inherently dangerous activity under Kentucky law, despite the use of heavy vehicles.
- KRS 189.670’s public policy regarding heavy motor trucks applies only to vehicles designed to carry freight or merchandise in bulk, not to tow trucks designed for roadside assistance.
- The public duty doctrine shields 911 operators from liability absent a special relationship with an injured party.
Why It Matters
This decision significantly limits the scope of vicarious liability for independent contractors in Kentucky. Despite resulting in a reversal of a $164 million judgment, the court’s analysis clarifies that merely employing a heavy vehicle or possessing a contract with a company that uses such vehicles does not subject an insurer to vicarious liability for negligent driving. The decision establishes that the “inherently dangerous” exception focuses on risks inherent to the nature of the work itself, not risks that arise from the negligent performance of otherwise safe activities. This distinction has broad implications for companies that contract with independent service providers in industries involving motor vehicles, equipment, or other potentially hazardous tools.
The court’s rejection of KRS 189.670 as a basis for expanding vicarious liability also clarifies legislative intent: that statute addresses the specific public policy concerns of commercial freight transportation, not general roadside assistance services. The decision thus provides important guidance that contractual relationships between service providers and insurers do not automatically trigger vicarious liability merely because heavy vehicles are involved, protecting insurers and contractors from liability for driver negligence unrelated to the inherent dangers of the contracted service.