Background
Skip Lee Hansen was convicted in McCracken Circuit Court of two counts of third-degree rape, first-degree sexual abuse, three counts of possession or viewing matter portraying a sexual performance by a minor, six counts of using a minor in a sexual performance, and one count of unlawful transaction with a minor. The charges arose from his ongoing sexual abuse of the teenage daughter of his former partner, including soliciting nude images via Snapchat and engaging in sexual intercourse with the victim on multiple occasions. Forensic examination of electronic devices seized from Hansen’s home yielded corroborating photographs and videos. The jury sentenced him to eighteen years’ imprisonment, and this Court affirmed on direct appeal in 2020.
In August 2021, Hansen filed a motion to vacate under Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure 11.42 in the McCracken Circuit Court, alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel. After appointed counsel supplemented the motion and the circuit court conducted an evidentiary hearing, the court denied relief. Hansen appealed, raising two claims: that trial counsel was deficient for failing to consult a digital-forensics expert, and that counsel was deficient for calling a witness whose testimony corroborated the Commonwealth’s case and undermined the defense.
The Court’s Holding
The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court’s denial of Hansen’s RCr 11.42 motion on both grounds, applying the two-prong Strickland standard. On the digital-forensics claim, the court held that trial counsel’s decision not to retain such an expert was objectively reasonable trial strategy. Counsel had admitted the existence of the videos as part of his defense theory—rendering expert analysis of how the videos came to exist superfluous. The court further found no prejudice, because the video timestamps were uncontested and no evidence suggested an expert would have changed the outcome.
On the claim concerning witness David Peters, the court found that calling Peters was at least an attempt at mitigation and therefore fell within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance protected by Strickland’s strong presumption of soundness. Even assuming deficient performance, the court found no reasonable probability of a different result: Peters’s testimony was secondhand and the direct evidence against Hansen—including digital media, controlled phone calls, and the victim’s own testimony—was substantial. The circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying relief on either claim.
Key Takeaways
- A decision not to retain a digital-forensics expert is reasonable trial strategy when the defense theory concedes the existence of the challenged digital evidence, making expert testimony redundant rather than exculpatory.
- Calling a witness whose testimony proves less than helpful is not automatically deficient performance under Strickland; courts will uphold the decision as strategy if it was at least an attempt to benefit the defendant, such as mitigation.
- Even where performance may be questionable, a petitioner must independently establish prejudice—a reasonable probability that the outcome would have differed absent the alleged error—and strong independent evidence of guilt weighs heavily against that showing.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces the high bar defendants face when challenging trial strategy in post-conviction proceedings. Courts will not second-guess counsel’s tactical choices through hindsight, and the Strickland presumption of soundness is particularly robust when the challenged decision is tied to a coherent—if ultimately unsuccessful—theory of defense. Defense attorneys and post-conviction practitioners should note that conceding the existence of digital evidence as part of a trial strategy effectively forecloses later arguments that an expert was needed to contest that same evidence.
The case also illustrates that witness testimony cutting in multiple directions will rarely satisfy the prejudice prong when the balance of evidence is heavily against the defendant. For practitioners in Kentucky handling digital-evidence cases, the opinion signals that courts will scrutinize whether any proposed expert testimony would have added substantive value to the actual defense theory presented at trial, not merely whether digital evidence was central to the prosecution.