Background
Anthony and Molly Hicks divorced in 2016 under a Jefferson Family Court decree granting joint custody of their minor daughter. After both parties relocated to Oldham County, the case was transferred there in 2021, and in 2022 the parties reaffirmed joint custody with equal timesharing. In fall 2023, both parents filed competing motions for sole custody. The family court appointed a Friend of the Court (FOC) and ordered a custodial and psychological evaluation by Dr. Berla, but Anthony was slow to cooperate with that process.
In July 2024, Molly moved to suspend Anthony’s parenting time following a recorded phone call in which Anthony’s then-wife Angela described domestic violence, drug use, threats against litigation participants, and other alarming conduct. Although Angela later recanted, Anthony had by that point entered an Alford plea to an assault charge arising from the same events and admitted to violating a protective order. The family court suspended Anthony’s parenting time pending the psychological evaluation. The suspension was reinforced in November 2024 after Anthony, wearing what appeared to be a body camera, pulled the child out of class to visit her at school without authorization—conduct that the child’s therapist and the FOC said frightened the child. At a January 2025 hearing, the family court denied Anthony’s motion to reinstate any parenting time, finding that the child was afraid of Anthony and that Dr. Berla’s evaluation remained essential before further custody decisions could be made.
Separately, Molly sought permission to enroll the child—an academically gifted student with strong arts interests—in a Jefferson County performing arts magnet school for middle school, departing from a 2019 agreed order requiring Oldham County schooling. Anthony filed a preemptive motion to block the transfer. After a four-and-one-half-hour hearing in June 2025 that included testimony from the FOC, an Oldham County school official, and both parents, the family court in July 2025 granted Molly’s request and ordered the child to be enrolled in the Jefferson County magnet school.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeals affirmed both orders. On the parenting-time appeal (No. 2025-CA-0185-MR), the court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction Anthony’s challenges to the July 8 and November 20, 2024 orders because Anthony failed to file timely notices of appeal from those interlocutory orders within the 30-day window required by RAP 10(A). Child-custody orders, even interim ones entered under the family court’s continuing jurisdiction, are immediately appealable, and missing the deadline is fatal. The court reviewed only the January 17, 2025 order and found no manifest injustice. Although the family court did not explicitly invoke the KRS 403.320(3) “serious endangerment” standard, Anthony failed to request that specific finding below as required under CR 52.04, leaving the issue unpreserved. Reviewing for manifest injustice, the court concluded Anthony’s due process rights were satisfied because he ultimately received and participated in the January 2025 hearing; the delays caused by his failure to complete the psychological evaluation were of his own making; and his Alford plea to assault, his protective-order violation, and the child’s expressed fear of him independently supported the suspension.
On the school-enrollment appeal (No. 2025-CA-0931-MR), the court applied the best-interest-of-the-child standard and reviewed factual findings for clear error. It held that the family court’s factual findings were supported by substantial evidence—testimony about the magnet school’s gifted and arts programs, the child’s academic profile and expressed wishes, neighborhood and test-score comparisons, and the FOC’s report—and that no abuse of discretion occurred. The court rejected Anthony’s due process objection to the FOC’s testimony because he failed to object at the hearing and was able to cross-examine the FOC. It also applied invited-error estoppel to Anthony’s claim that the family court exceeded its authority by ruling in Molly’s favor: Anthony himself initiated the proceeding and all parties agreed at the outset that a best-interest hearing was the appropriate mechanism, foreclosing him from arguing on appeal that the court had no authority to grant that relief.
The court noted several briefing deficiencies under RAP 32(A)(4)—Anthony, proceeding pro se, frequently omitted preservation statements—but declined to strike the brief or ignore the arguments, given the fundamental interests at stake in parent-child relationships. It instead reviewed unpreserved arguments under the manifest-injustice standard throughout.
Key Takeaways
- Interim child-custody and parenting-time orders entered under a family court’s continuing jurisdiction are immediately appealable; a parent who misses the 30-day RAP 10(A) deadline cannot revive those orders by piggybacking on a later, timely appeal.
- When a family court omits an essential finding—such as the KRS 403.320(3) “serious endangerment” finding required to restrict visitation—a party must request that finding in writing under CR 52.04 to preserve the issue for appeal, even though CR 52.01 independently obligates the court to make findings.
- Unilateral conduct by a custodial parent in switching school districts is problematic (see Swan v. Gatewood), but the risk can be avoided—or at least adjudicated properly—if the other parent timely seeks court intervention, as Anthony did here by filing his anticipatory motion before enrollment occurred.
- A party who agrees at a hearing that the best-interest standard governs a school-choice dispute and that a full evidentiary hearing is the proper procedure cannot later argue on appeal that the court lacked authority to rule against him on those very terms—invited error bars the claim.
- Pro se litigants are not exempt from appellate briefing rules, but courts may exercise discretion to review for manifest injustice when the welfare of a child is at stake.
Why It Matters
The decision reinforces two procedural traps that frequently ensnare self-represented parents in ongoing custody litigation. First, the rule that interim custody orders are immediately appealable—not merely interlocutory stepping stones—means parents must monitor deadlines carefully even when the family court signals that more proceedings are coming. Missing the window on an early order can leave a parent without appellate recourse for the most consequential rulings in a case. Second, the court’s application of CR 52.04 to the serious-endangerment finding illustrates that even mandatory judicial duties can be forfeited on appeal if the aggrieved party does not formally prompt the court to supply the missing finding before taking an appeal.
On the school-enrollment side, the opinion provides a practical roadmap: when a parent suspects the other is about to transfer a child to a different school district in violation of an agreed order, filing an anticipatory motion before enrollment occurs both triggers the court’s authority and avoids the unilateral-action problem the court criticized in Swan v. Gatewood. Family law practitioners should counsel clients accordingly and ensure that any agreed school-placement provisions are revisited proactively as children approach school transitions.