Background
Brittany Hoak was attacked by a pit bull terrier on November 7, 2023, while crossing the backyard of property owned by Left Back Properties, LLC, and rented to Fermin Alvarado. Hoak lived with the dog and several others in a garage at the back of the premises. She was crossing the yard to reach a side gate when the attack occurred. Her face and arm were badly injured, and she suffered a fractured jaw requiring emergency surgery at University of Louisville Hospital. Animal control officers cited Sixto Alvarado as an owner of the dog.
Hoak sued Sixto Alvarado, Jennifer Mitchell, and Left Back Properties in Jefferson Circuit Court on January 17, 2024, asserting statutory strict liability and common law negligence. Alvarado and Mitchell were never served with process. Hoak served written discovery with her complaint. Left Back Properties moved to dismiss under CR 12.02 on May 17, 2024, but the circuit court denied that motion on August 8, 2024, explaining that the “case is still in its infancy” and allowing further discovery.
Left Back Properties moved for summary judgment on October 30, 2025. It admitted owning the property but denied knowing that the pit bull was kept there or that the dog had dangerous propensities. It also argued that it was not a statutory dog owner because it did not occupy the leased premises. Hoak responded that the landlord’s visits and inspections made it a statutory owner, that factual disputes remained about its knowledge, and that more discovery was needed. The circuit court granted summary judgment on December 23, 2025, finding no affirmative evidence supporting either statutory liability or knowledge of the dog and its vicious tendencies.
The Court’s Holding
The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed in an opinion by Judge Combs, with all panel members concurring. It first rejected Hoak’s argument that summary judgment was premature. Although summary judgment itself is reviewed de novo, the trial court’s determination that enough time had passed to rule on the motion is reviewed for abuse of discretion. The court emphasized that the opposing party need only have an adequate opportunity to conduct discovery, not actually complete it.
The court characterized the case as a straightforward tort action in which nearly two years had elapsed since discovery began. Hoak said numerous depositions remained, partly because the individual defendants could not be located, but she did not explain why depositions of other witnesses were not scheduled or what steps were taken to secure Alvarado’s and Mitchell’s participation. On those case-specific circumstances, the panel found no abuse of discretion.
On strict liability, the court held that Left Back Properties was not a statutory dog owner under KRS 258.235 and KRS 258.095(5)(b)3. The latter provision includes a person who permits a dog to remain on premises “owned and occupied” by that person. Relying on Deramos v. Anderson Communities, Inc., 709 S.W.3d 197, 200–01 (Ky. 2025), the court explained that the General Assembly’s 2017 replacement of “or” with “and” narrowed landlord liability following Benningfield ex rel. Benningfield v. Zinsmeister, 367 S.W.3d 561 (Ky. 2012). Left Back Properties’ lease-based right of entry and its representative’s single visit to collect rent and observe the backyard did not establish occupancy. Its exceedingly limited contact did not convert ownership into occupancy.
The negligence ruling rested on a separate rationale. Unlike strict liability, common law negligence requires fault, including prior knowledge of the dog’s vicious or mischievous propensity. Citing Hanna v. Shea, 717 S.W.3d 568, 572 (Ky. App. 2025), the court found no evidence that Left Back Properties even knew the dog existed, much less knew of dangerous propensities. It therefore affirmed judgment for the landlord on both claims.
Key Takeaways
- A landowner must both own and occupy the relevant premises to qualify as a statutory dog owner under the provision addressed here.
- A lease-based right of entry and a single visit to collect rent and observe the backyard did not establish occupancy by Left Back Properties.
- The discovery ruling was circumstance-specific: nearly two years of opportunity, unexplained delays concerning other witnesses, and no explained steps to join the individual defendants supported the trial court’s ruling.
- Strict liability and negligence failed for different reasons: no statutory owner status for the former and no evidence of prior knowledge or fault for the latter.
Why It Matters
The decision applies the Kentucky Supreme Court’s Deramos discussion of the 2017 statutory amendment to a nonresident landlord with minimal contact with rental property. It confirms that ownership alone is insufficient for the statutory strict-liability theory at issue and that limited property visits do not necessarily establish occupancy.
The opinion also separates the standards governing appellate review: de novo review of summary judgment and abuse-of-discretion review of the timing decision. Its discovery analysis turns on this record rather than establishing a universal two-year rule. A footnote additionally observed that Hoak’s routine care of the dog could arguably make her a putative owner, but the court did not decide that issue.