Background
A non-mobile infant sustained multiple rib fractures, jaw bruising, and an eye hemorrhage determined to be non-accidental trauma. The child alternated between her mother’s and father’s households on a 2-2-3 timesharing schedule beginning in January 2025. Medical examinations in March and April 2025 revealed the injuries, and the Cabinet for Health and Family Services filed abuse and neglect petitions against six adults: the child’s biological parents, the mother’s boyfriend, and three members of the father’s household—his father (paternal grandfather), mother (paternal grandmother), and 18-year-old sister (paternal aunt).
The Cabinet acknowledged it could not identify which individual or household caused the injuries, nor establish a specific timeline for when they occurred. Nevertheless, the trial court adjudicated all six as abusers based on their “access” and “opportunity” to the child. Only the three paternal relatives appealed. The trial court’s amended order found each had participated in the child’s care or caregiving environment and “failed to protect the child or provide an adequate explanation for the injuries.”
The Court’s Holding
The Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed the abuse adjudications as to the paternal grandfather, paternal grandmother, and paternal aunt. The court held that while the abuse of the child was clearly established, the trial court violated the burden of proof standard by adjudicating individuals without individualized evidence that they either inflicted abuse or knew—or should have known—of its infliction. The court emphasized that under KRS 620.100(3), the Cabinet bears the burden to prove by preponderance of evidence that a specific person “inflicts or allows to be inflicted” physical injury, a standard that presupposes knowledge or reason to know if that person is not the perpetrator.
The opinion found critical error in the trial court’s implicit burden-shifting: requiring these appellants to explain injuries they denied witnessing or knowing about. The court noted Dr. Currie’s uncontradicted testimony that rib fractures are often not recognized by caregivers and that non-offending caregivers may be completely unaware an infant’s ribs are broken. The record showed no evidence that the appellants observed any bruise, were present during any injurious event, or had any knowledge that triggered a duty to act. The trial court’s statement—”the injuries were caused by someone in this room . . . or someone else”—undermined any finding that these three specifically caused or should have known of the abuse.
The court further held that non-parents cannot be adjudicated for abuse without evidence they “assumed the role and responsibility of a parent or guardian” as a “person exercising custodial control or supervision” (PECCS). Here, the appellants were essentially babysitters with limited and occasional contact: the paternal aunt babysat alone for 30 minutes once in January; the paternal grandfather rarely had caretaking time due to work travel; and the paternal grandmother provided limited supervision during the father’s work or sleep. Mere access during a two-month period, without more, was insufficient to sustain adjudication.
Key Takeaways
- Burden of proof is not shifable: Trial courts cannot require non-perpetrator defendants to explain injuries they deny witnessing or knowing about when the Cabinet’s own investigator and medical expert cannot identify the perpetrator.
- Access and opportunity are insufficient: A finding that an individual had access to a child during the period injuries occurred does not, standing alone, establish abuse without individualized evidence of knowledge, participation, or the assumed role of a parent or guardian.
- Non-parents require heightened showing: Individuals who are not biological or legal parents can be adjudicated in child abuse proceedings only if evidence establishes they assumed the role and responsibility of a parent or guardian, not merely that they babysat or lived in the same household.
- Risk of harm requires more than inference: A risk of harm cannot rest on inferences upon inferences or mere speculation; it must be an actual and reasonable potential for harm.
Why It Matters
This decision significantly clarifies the evidentiary bar for adjudications in multi-adult abuse cases, particularly when the perpetrator cannot be identified. It prevents the expansion of abuse registries to individuals based solely on access and presence in a home, a protection critical given that substantiated abuse findings carry lasting collateral consequences—affecting employment, licensing, and custody rights. The opinion distinguishes sharply between the Cabinet’s statutory duty to investigate broadly and the narrower adjudicatory standard that protects individuals from permanent designation as abusers without personal knowledge of or participation in abuse.
For family courts, the opinion reaffirms that trial courts cannot lower the preponderance standard through clever factfinding formulations that convert lack of knowledge into evidence of responsibility. For practitioners, it provides clear precedent that even when child abuse is proven and multiple adults had access to the child, each respondent is entitled to individualized findings grounded in evidence specific to their conduct, knowledge, or failure to protect—not circumstantial presence in the home.