Background
Harold Miller, Jr. and Syrene Marie Miller shared joint custody of their child under a schedule that gave Mother six nights and Father eight nights during a typical 14-day period. In March 2025, Mother moved to reduce Father’s parenting time, alleging that he called Mother and the child names, involved the child in parental disputes, repeatedly contacted and tracked the child during Mother’s parenting time, displayed anger, and engaged in other troubling conduct, including an alleged shoplifting incident.
After an evidentiary hearing, a domestic relations commissioner recommended reducing Father’s parenting time to every other weekend under the local visitation guidelines. The Grayson Circuit Court adopted that recommendation while leaving joint custody intact. Neither the commissioner nor the circuit court identified the governing statutory standard, expressly addressed the child’s best interests or serious endangerment, or explained how the facts satisfied the requirements for modifying timesharing.
The Court’s Holding
The Kentucky Court of Appeals vacated the modification and remanded. It held that the circuit court committed reversible error by failing to identify and apply the mandatory standard in KRS 403.320(3), explain its reasoning, and identify the facts on which it relied. A conclusory statement that the commissioner’s findings and application of law were supported by evidence and precedent did not permit meaningful appellate review.
The court explained that KRS 403.320(3), rather than the initial-custody standard in KRS 403.270, governs a request to modify timesharing. A court may modify timesharing upon first finding that modification serves the child’s best interests, but it may restrict a parent to less-than-reasonable timesharing only upon finding serious danger to the child’s physical, mental, moral, or emotional health. The Court of Appeals did not decide whether either standard was satisfied; it directed the circuit court to make that determination on remand and give specific factual and legal reasons for its decision.
Key Takeaways
- KRS 403.320(3) governs modification of timesharing when custody itself is not being changed.
- A trial court must identify the governing standard, the facts on which it relies, and why modification is or is not necessary.
- Best interests can support a modification, but less-than-reasonable timesharing requires a finding of serious endangerment.
Why It Matters
The opinion reinforces that evidence of troubling parental conduct does not substitute for the findings and legal conclusions required by statute. Trial courts must connect the evidence to the applicable best-interests or serious-endangerment standard so the parties and reviewing court can understand the basis for a timesharing decision.
The ruling also confirms that an appellate court will not infer the required determination from the record or make it in the first instance. Even where preservation is imperfect, failure to apply the mandatory statutory framework can require vacatur and remand.