Background
Alexxandria Richter (“Mother”) and Jacob Kittle (“Father”) are the parents of E.K., born in 2014. The parties established joint custody and equal parenting time by agreed order in 2015. Over the following decade, the custody arrangement was a source of persistent litigation. Beginning in 2019, Mother made a series of reports to the Cabinet for Health and Family Services and Child Protective Services alleging Father had abused or neglected E.K. Each investigation — in 2019, 2021, 2022, and again in 2024 — concluded without any finding of improper conduct by Father. Nonetheless, each report triggered suspensions or restrictions on Father’s parenting time, and multiple forensic and therapeutic interviews of the child.
Father repeatedly sought to hold Mother in contempt for her failure to comply with parenting time orders and filed multiple motions for sole custody based on her refusal to co-parent. The family court documented at least seven instances in which Mother interfered with Father’s court-ordered parenting time. In December 2024, Mother obtained an Emergency Protective Order on E.K.’s behalf, which the family court subsequently dismissed, finding Mother had filed the petition specifically to interfere with Father’s parenting time over Christmas. In March 2025, Mother contacted police to report an outstanding bench warrant against Father — for an unpaid tax of which he was unaware — on a day he was scheduled to exercise parenting time, leading to his arrest.
Following a final hearing in April 2025, the Jefferson County Family Court issued a detailed 25-page order on July 21, 2025, awarding Father sole custody of E.K. while maintaining the existing equal parenting time schedule for both parties. The court found that Mother had demonstrated a longstanding and continuing inability to facilitate Father’s relationship with the child, had repeatedly defied court orders, and that her conduct bordered on emotional abuse of E.K. Mother moved to alter, amend, or vacate the order; the family court denied the motion. Mother appealed.
The Court’s Holding
The Kentucky Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed the family court’s order awarding sole custody to Father. The appellate court applied the deferential abuse-of-discretion standard articulated in Coffman v. Rankin, 260 S.W.3d 767 (Ky. 2008), and found that the family court’s extensive factual findings were supported by substantial evidence and that the correct law had been applied. The court rejected Mother’s argument that the modification lacked a sufficient finding of a material change in circumstances, concluding that years of constant discord and Mother’s documented defiance of court orders plainly established such a change under KRS 403.340(3).
The court also rejected Mother’s reliance on Squires v. Squires, 854 S.W.2d 765 (Ky. 1993), for the proposition that a lack of cooperation between parents cannot alone support modification of joint custody. While acknowledging that cooperation is not a condition precedent to joint custody, the court noted that KRS 403.340(2) and (3) nonetheless authorize modification of joint custody “in situations where the parties are unable to cooperate,” citing Scheer v. Zeigler, 21 S.W.3d 807 (Ky. App. 2000). The record here, the court found, reflected conduct far exceeding mere animosity — Mother’s repeated unsubstantiated abuse allegations, unilateral decision-making, and persistent refusal to comply with court orders had rendered joint custody unworkable and were detrimental to the child.
As to the statutory presumption favoring joint custody under KRS 403.340(5), the court held that the family court had properly found sufficient evidence to rebut it. Notably, the family court simultaneously preserved equal parenting time for both parents, concluding Father had not presented sufficient evidence to overcome the separate presumption in favor of equal timesharing.
Key Takeaways
- A parent’s sustained, documented pattern of defying parenting-time orders, making repeated unsubstantiated abuse allegations, and excluding the other parent from joint decision-making can constitute a material change in circumstances and support modification from joint to sole custody under KRS 403.340.
- Kentucky courts may modify joint custody where one parent’s conduct renders cooperation genuinely impossible — not merely difficult — even though Squires v. Squires holds that goodwill between parents is not a prerequisite for joint custody.
- The presumption favoring joint custody under KRS 403.340(5) is rebuttable; here, the family court rebutted it based on Mother’s conduct while simultaneously preserving equal parenting time under the separate presumption favoring equal timesharing.
- Appellate review of custody decisions is highly deferential: the test is not whether the appellate court would have decided the matter differently, but whether the family court’s findings were clearly erroneous or reflected an abuse of discretion.
Why It Matters
This decision illustrates the outer boundary of parental interference that Kentucky courts will tolerate before stripping joint custody rights. Over roughly six years, the family court attempted progressively less restrictive interventions — co-parenting therapy, contempt proceedings, supervision requirements — before concluding that sole custody was necessary. The opinion underscores that a parent who repeatedly weaponizes child-protective processes, without substantiation, risks not only losing joint decision-making authority but also being found to be inflicting emotional harm on the child.
Practitioners advising clients in high-conflict custody matters should note the court’s careful doctrinal distinction between the presumption favoring joint custody (rebuttable by evidence of unworkable co-parenting) and the separate presumption favoring equal parenting time (which survived here because Father presented no independent evidence to overcome it). The case is designated “Not To Be Published” under Kentucky rules and therefore carries no precedential weight, but it offers a detailed factual template for how Kentucky family courts may respond to chronic, one-sided interference with court-ordered parenting arrangements.