Background
Tammy Thomas and her adult son, Alexander Thomas, filed competing petitions for protective orders. Alexander alleged that Tammy’s conduct had escalated despite repeated demands that she stop contacting his family. He described her prolonged appearance at his home, repeated calls and messages, social-media activity, and a November 2025 confrontation during which she followed him to his car and prevented him from closing the door. Recordings included Tammy saying she would appear at his front door if he did not speak with her and that she would “keep getting crazier” if he did nothing.
After a March 2026 hearing, the Bullitt Family Court found that Alexander had established domestic violence and entered a three-year domestic violence order protecting him and his three children. Tammy later sought a protective order against Alexander based principally on the November confrontation and alleged emotional and psychological abuse from being kept away from her grandchildren. Following a second hearing, the family court found that Tammy had not proven an act of domestic violence and denied her petition. Tammy appealed both rulings pro se.
The Court’s Holding
The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed both orders. Although Tammy’s appellate briefs substantially failed to comply with briefing rules—including by omitting supporting authority, adequate record citations, and preservation statements—the court exercised its discretion to reach the merits because the records were limited, the appellee’s briefs were also deficient, and the cases implicated the proper use of domestic-violence proceedings and children’s safety.
Substantial evidence supported the order protecting Alexander and his children, and the family court did not abuse its discretion by preventing Tammy from questioning Alexander about his relationship with Jesus Christ because that inquiry was not germane to whether domestic violence occurred. The appellate court declined to reweigh testimony or disturb the family court’s credibility findings. It also upheld the denial of Tammy’s petition and found no abuse of discretion in excluding her proposed exhibits: the family court identified hearsay concerns, the absence of the relevant declarants, handwritten annotations, and the lack of relevance of much of the material. The record also contradicted Tammy’s assertion that Alexander had been allowed to introduce unauthenticated documents, because he did not move his filed documents into evidence.
Key Takeaways
- A Kentucky domestic violence order requires proof by a preponderance of the evidence that domestic violence occurred and is likely to occur again, including conduct that inflicts fear of imminent physical injury or assault between family members.
- Family courts have broad discretion to limit cross-examination that is irrelevant, confusing, harassing, repetitive, or only marginally related to the issues.
- Appellate courts defer to a family court’s credibility determinations and will not substitute their judgment when factual findings are supported by substantial evidence.
Why It Matters
The decision illustrates that threatening or escalating conduct may support a domestic violence order even without proof of completed physical harm. The relevant statutory definition includes the infliction of fear of imminent physical injury or assault.
It also reinforces that self-represented litigants must comply with appellate briefing and evidentiary rules. Although the court reviewed these appeals despite major briefing defects, it emphasized that pro se status does not excuse noncompliance.