Background
Jennifer Zaccheus-Miller pleaded guilty to two Class C felony counts of theft by unlawful taking. On April 16, 2025, the Campbell Circuit Court sentenced her to six years in prison, ordered restitution, and immediately remanded her to custody. The judgment and sentence was entered by the circuit court clerk on April 17, 2025.
On October 14, 2025, Zaccheus-Miller moved for shock probation under KRS 439.265. The circuit court concluded that the motion was filed one day after the statute’s 180-day deadline, measured from her April 16 sentencing and remand, and therefore held that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the motion’s merits. Zaccheus-Miller appealed, arguing that the 180-day period began when the judgment was entered on April 17.
The Court’s Holding
The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed. Reviewing the jurisdictional issue de novo, the court held that KRS 439.265 requires strict compliance with its time limits and ties the filing period to the defendant’s delivery into the custody of the jailer following conviction and sentencing, not to the clerk’s later entry of the written judgment.
Because it was undisputed that Zaccheus-Miller was sentenced and remanded to custody on April 16, 2025, the 180-day period expired on October 13, 2025. Her October 14 motion was therefore untimely, and the circuit court correctly determined that it lacked jurisdiction to reach the merits. All three appellate judges concurred.
Key Takeaways
- Kentucky courts require strict compliance with KRS 439.265’s deadline for filing a shock-probation motion.
- The statutory period begins when the defendant is placed in the jailer’s custody following conviction and sentencing, rather than when the clerk enters the written judgment.
- A shock-probation motion filed after the 180-day period leaves the circuit court without jurisdiction to consider its merits.
Why It Matters
The decision clarifies that counsel calculating Kentucky’s shock-probation deadline cannot rely on the judgment’s docket-entry date when the defendant was sentenced and remanded earlier. Even a one-day delay is jurisdictionally fatal under the court’s strict application of KRS 439.265.