Background
Barbara Coleman presented to Ochsner LSU Health Monroe on February 11, 2022, with vaginitis and a yeast infection. Nurse Practitioner Candace Crow prescribed Metformin. Coleman alleged the medication worsened her condition, causing severe vaginal rash and painful blistering that required an emergency room visit on March 13, 2022. Coleman claimed Crow prescribed Metformin despite Coleman’s prior notification of gastric problems from the drug, dietary restrictions, past gallbladder surgery, and without referring her to a physician.
The Medical Review Panel Opinion, rendered May 9, 2024, unanimously found no breach of the standard of care. Coleman filed suit on July 1, 2024. The defendants moved for summary judgment on October 30, 2024, arguing that Coleman had presented no evidence of breach or causation and citing immunity under Louisiana’s Health Emergency Powers Act (LHEPA) for treatment during the COVID-19 emergency period (March 11, 2020 to March 16, 2022). Coleman presented no evidence opposing the motion—only her affidavit and interrogatories to the medical review panel.
The trial court granted summary judgment on August 13, 2025, dismissing all claims with prejudice against both defendants and denied Coleman’s motion for new trial.
The Court’s Holding
The Louisiana Court of Appeal affirmed the summary judgment. The court held that Coleman failed to meet her burden under La. C.C.P. art. 966(D)(1) by introducing no summary judgment evidence whatsoever. The court emphasized that the nonmoving party in a medical malpractice case must introduce prima facie evidence of breach of the standard of care and causation to survive summary judgment, as these elements cannot be proved without expert medical evidence.
The court rejected Coleman’s objections to the Medical Review Panel Opinion, noting that even if valid, they would not change the outcome because Coleman failed to carry her burden regardless of the MRPO’s admissibility. The court further held that although LHEPA’s gross negligence standard applied to treatment during the COVID emergency, this immunity provision was unnecessary—Coleman failed to present evidence even of ordinary negligence, let alone gross negligence. The LHEPA provision created a “belt and suspenders” effect supporting summary judgment.
The court emphasized that Coleman’s failure to introduce evidence of breach was fatal to her claim and that her complaints about deposition timing and lack of discovery time were procedurally defective (she failed to file the required affidavit under La. C.C.P. art. 967(C)).
Key Takeaways
- Medical malpractice plaintiffs must introduce prima facie evidence of breach of the standard of care and causation at summary judgment or face dismissal; the defendant’s expert opinion finding no breach, when uncontradicted by plaintiff evidence, supports summary judgment.
- In medical malpractice cases, expert medical evidence is essential to establish the applicable standard of care; a plaintiff’s personal affidavit cannot substitute for such evidence.
- La. C.C.P. art. 967(C) requires a party claiming inadequate discovery time to file an affidavit explaining why; failure to do so forfeits this argument.
- LHEPA immunity provisions requiring proof of gross negligence (rather than ordinary negligence) for healthcare provider liability apply to treatment during the COVID-19 emergency period, but such immunity may be unnecessary if plaintiff fails to establish ordinary negligence.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces the high evidentiary bar for surviving summary judgment in medical malpractice actions. Plaintiffs must present actual expert evidence of breach and causation, not merely allegation or speculation. The court’s affirmance demonstrates that procedural defects—such as failing to timely depose opposing parties or properly invoking inadequate discovery—combined with lack of substantive evidence, result in summary judgment regardless of the merits of the underlying complaint.
The decision also clarifies the application of LHEPA’s COVID-19 emergency immunity provisions. While these provisions shifted the burden to defendants by raising the standard to gross negligence, the court noted this protection serves as an additional layer of defense, not a substitute for the plaintiff’s fundamental obligation to prove breach of the standard of care in the first instance.