Background
On March 11, 2022, a fire broke out at the Shreveport home of Lawson Schuford, who was bedridden and entirely dependent on his full-time caregiver of more than fifteen years, Rosemary Jones. Jones called 911 and told the dispatcher “the stove is on fire.” Firefighters found Schuford in his bed and pulled both occupants from the home. Schuford died of smoke inhalation upon arriving at the hospital; Jones survived in serious condition for nearly a year and a half before dying on October 2, 2023, from her injuries. It was a Friday — the same day Jones continued Schuford’s longstanding tradition of frying fish, a task that had fallen to her after he became bedridden.
Two independent fire investigators concluded the fire originated on the front right burner of the kitchen electric stove, consistent with Jones’s own 911 report. Shreveport Fire Department Investigator Lawrence Bunton found the exact cause unknown but consistent with stovetop origin. Randy Stephens of EFI Global, retained by the insurer, concluded cooking oil heated to its ignition temperature in a pan on the front right burner caused the fire, ruling out all other potential heat sources. Neither investigator found evidence of defective wiring, malfunctioning appliances, or faulty gas lines.
Jones’s husband and daughters filed suit against Schuford’s estate and his homeowner’s insurer, alleging he negligently failed to maintain a safe home and workplace and that defective gas lines and appliances caused the fire. Defendants moved twice for summary judgment. Plaintiffs filed an untimely opposition to the first motion and no opposition at all to the second. The trial court nonetheless denied summary judgment, finding genuine issues of material fact on causation and insurance coverage. Defendants sought supervisory review, and the Second Circuit granted the writ to docket with full briefing and oral argument.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeal reversed on de novo review, finding defendants had satisfied their burden of pointing to an absence of factual support for plaintiffs’ claims, which shifted the burden to plaintiffs to produce prima facie evidence of a genuine issue of material fact. Plaintiffs failed to meet that burden. The uncontradicted record showed Schuford was bedridden and not cooking; Jones was responsible for cooking and herself reported the stove was on fire; both investigators agreed the fire originated at the stovetop; and plaintiffs presented no evidence — through testing, expert opinion, or otherwise — that the home was improperly maintained, that gas lines were defective, or that any appliance malfunctioned. The court emphasized that nearly three years of pre-hearing discovery time rendered plaintiffs’ request for more time meritless, particularly given that reliable testing of the scene was by then unlikely after four years.
The court also rejected plaintiffs’ insurance coverage theory. Schuford’s homeowner’s policy provided personal liability coverage (Coverage L) only “for all sums for which an insured is legally liable.” The court held the policy plainly requires a finding of legal liability before coverage is triggered — it does not function as a workers’ compensation policy entitling a domestic employee to no-fault recovery for on-the-job injuries. The medical payments provision (Coverage M), which carves out domestic employees from the general household-resident exclusion, likewise operates only where the insured is found liable for the injury, not as a standalone first-party claim mechanism.
As to evidentiary issues, the court held Stephens’s affidavit and attached report were properly before the court under La. C.C.P. art. 967(A). Even absent formal Daubert qualification as an expert, his report was admissible as lay opinion testimony under La. C.E. art. 701, rationally based on his own scene observations and nearly four decades of fire investigation experience. The two investigators’ reports did not contradict each other — both identified the front right stove burner as the point of origin — and plaintiffs’ characterization of a factual conflict between them was without merit. The court dismissed all claims with prejudice and assessed costs to plaintiffs. Judge Hunter dissented, arguing the manifest error standard — not de novo review — applied and that the trial court’s denial of summary judgment represented a reasonable view of the evidence.
Key Takeaways
- Under Louisiana law, the mere occurrence of a fire does not support an inference of negligence; plaintiffs must produce evidence showing the defendant’s negligence is the “most likely” or “most plausible” cause, and speculation or bare possibilities will not suffice to defeat summary judgment.
- A homeowner’s personal liability policy is not a workers’ compensation substitute — a domestic employee (or her survivors) cannot recover under the liability or medical payments provisions without a finding that the insured homeowner was legally liable for her injuries.
- A fire investigator’s affidavit and report can be considered as lay opinion testimony under La. C.E. art. 701 even without formal expert qualification, provided the opinion is rationally grounded in the witness’s personal observations and experience.
- When defendants demonstrate an absence of factual support for plaintiffs’ claims under La. C.C.P. art. 966(D)(1), plaintiffs cannot defeat summary judgment by pointing to uncertainty in the evidence or arguing that additional discovery might eventually produce supporting facts, particularly after years of available discovery time have passed.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces the practical limits of fire-liability litigation in Louisiana when both the alleged tortfeasor and the key eyewitness are deceased. It makes clear that evidentiary silence — the absence of proof that a defect or hazard caused a fire — cannot itself create a triable issue; plaintiffs must affirmatively produce some evidence tending to support their theory of liability. Defense counsel can use this decision to challenge fire cases in which plaintiffs rely solely on uncertainty in the investigative record rather than on affirmative expert or physical evidence of a defect.
The court’s treatment of the homeowner’s insurance policy also has broad significance for domestic workers’ claims. By holding that Coverage M’s domestic employee carve-out does not create no-fault recovery rights, the decision clarifies that homeowner’s liability policies remain fault-dependent instruments even when injured parties are household employees — a distinction that matters as domestic worker injury litigation continues to develop across jurisdictions.