Background
Lewisburg-Bellevue Water System, Inc. (“LBWS”), a private non-profit corporation that operates a water system in St. Landry Parish, sued its former member and customer, Ignatius “Iggy” Eaglin, in July 2025. LBWS styled its suit as a Petition on Open Account. According to the amended petition, Eaglin verbally threatened and physically assaulted an LBWS employee on February 6, 2025, while the employee was lawfully carrying out his duties; Eaglin was arrested and charged by the St. Landry Parish Sheriff’s Department. LBWS responded by expelling Eaglin from membership and disconnecting water service to his residence. Relying on its by-laws and rules, which provide that costs and damages caused by a member’s actions “shall be paid by” the member and added to his bill, LBWS sought $8,645.33, plus attorney fees under La.R.S. 9:2781, interest, and costs.
The itemized damages included $2,970.00 for emergency water-meter removal, $308.25 for three employees to oversee the removal, $600.00 in filing fees for injunctive relief in a separate lawsuit, $4,050.00 in attorney fees from that separate suit, $425.00 for work by three board members, $42.08 in board-member travel expenses, and $250.00 for a security detail. After Eaglin filed exceptions of vagueness and lis pendens, LBWS amended its petition; Eaglin then filed a peremptory exception of no cause of action. Following an October 31, 2025 hearing, the Twenty-Seventh Judicial District Court (Hon. Gregory J. Doucet) sustained the exception and dismissed the petition by written judgment signed November 3, 2025. LBWS appealed.
The Court’s Holding
Writing for a panel of Judges Elizabeth A. Pickett, Charles G. Fitzgerald, and Ledricka J. Thierry, Judge Fitzgerald applied de novo review, as required for rulings on the peremptory exception of no cause of action, accepting the petition’s well-pleaded facts as true and resolving every doubt in the plaintiff’s favor under Scheffler v. Adams and Reese, LLP, 06-1774 (La. 2/22/07), 950 So.2d 641.
The court first held the petition does not state a cause of action on an open account under La.R.S. 9:2781(D). The only account that could qualify is Eaglin’s customer account for water service, yet the petition nowhere alleges that this account’s balance was past due when service was terminated. Nor does the petition identify any contract governing the water supply, an essential element of an open account claim under Gulfstream Servs., Inc. v. Hot Energy Servs., Inc., 04-1223 (La.App. 1 Cir. 3/24/05), 907 So.2d 96. The court likewise rejected LBWS’s alternative breach-of-contract theory: the suit seeks damages flowing from Eaglin’s alleged assault on an employee, which sounds in tort, not contract, citing DePhillips v. Hosp. Serv. Dist. No. 1 of Tangipahoa Par., 19-1496 (La. 7/9/20), 340 So.3d 817.
Turning to Eaglin’s argument that the claimed damages were too remote under Pitre v. Opelousas General Hospital, 530 So.2d 1151 (La.1988), the panel emphasized that Pitre’s foreseeability framework governs negligence. Here, the alleged conduct is an intentional tort, so the court need not decide which damages were foreseeable; under the principle Pitre itself recognized, one who intentionally violates a legal duty is liable for damages that are a direct consequence of the breach. The court expressly reserved the question of which damages are direct consequences “for another day.” Concluding that the petition states a valid cause of action under general tort law, La.Civ.Code art. 2315, the court held the trial court legally erred in sustaining the exception. It reversed the November 3, 2025 judgment, remanded for further proceedings, and assessed appeal costs to Eaglin.
Key Takeaways
- A petition on open account fails where it alleges no past-due balance on the only plausible account and identifies no underlying contract, as required by La.R.S. 9:2781(D) and First Circuit precedent.
- A suit seeking damages caused by an assault sounds in tort, not contract, even where the plaintiff frames liability through corporate by-laws purporting to shift costs to the member.
- Pitre’s foreseeability limit on damages applies to negligence; for intentional torts, the defendant is liable for all damages that are a direct consequence of the wrongful act, so remoteness is no basis to sustain a no-cause-of-action exception at the pleading stage.
- Even a mislabeled petition survives a peremptory exception if, accepting well-pleaded facts as true, it states any valid cause of action — here, general tort liability under La.Civ.Code art. 2315.
Why It Matters
The decision is a practical reminder that under Louisiana’s de novo review of no-cause-of-action exceptions, the label on a petition is not controlling: although LBWS’s open account and contract theories failed, the court was obliged to ask whether the petition stated any valid claim, and it found one in tort. Pleading defects in the chosen theory therefore will not doom a case where the operative facts support another theory.
The opinion also draws a clean line between negligence and intentional torts for remoteness-of-damages arguments at the pleading stage, limiting Pitre’s foreseeability screen to negligence while leaving the direct-consequence inquiry for intentional torts to later proceedings. Attorneys defending exception practice should note that remoteness attacks on intentional-tort damages are unlikely to succeed on the face of the pleadings.